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This thesis assesses the copyright protection of AI-generated works in the European Union. 
AI-generated work means a work of art that is generated independently by an AI system that 
relies on machine learning and artificial neural network technology in functioning. The 
human input in the creation process of an AI-generated work is non-existent. Today, the AI-
generated works can be found in almost every copyrightable medium, such as in the field of 
music, art and literature.  
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. The aim of the first part of this thesis is to analyze whether 
the AI-generated works are currently protected under the European Union copyright law. In 
order to answer this question, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
the field is analyzed. The aim of the second part of this thesis is to assess whether the AI-
generated works should be protected and if the answer is yes, who should be allocated the 
rights and by which legal tool. 
The questions analyzed in this thesis are significant as the importance of AI-generated works 
in our society is constantly increasing. If the AI-generated works are not protected and the 
protection regime remain unclear, this will have a negative impact on investments. 
Consequently, the number of valuable works would decrease in the society. 
This thesis focuses on the European Union copyright law and follows the traditional legal 
dogmatic approach. In addition, de lege ferenda approach is adopted in the second part of 
this thesis. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that the AI-generated works are not currently protected under 
the European Union copyright law. This conclusion is mainly based on the finding that the 
AI-generated works are not regarded original work of authorship established by the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is further concluded that the current 
legislative environment, in which the valuable AI-generated works fall within the public 
domain should be avoided. It is proposed that the authorship in the AI-generated works would 
be allocated to the user of the AI-system. For this purpose, it is suggested that EU would 
adopt the US based work-for-hire doctrine, under which the AI system would be regarded as 
a creative “employee” of the user. 
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Technological changes have placed tensions on the scope and application of the 
European Union (“EU”) copyright law over the decades. The PC revolution in the 
1980’s caused a permanent shift in consumer attitudes and practices concerning the 
reproduction of copyrighted works. The Internet revolution in the 1990’s had the same 
effect with respect to the distribution of those works.1 Currently, the EU copyright law 
is facing the third computer-enabled technological shift: the rapid advance in artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) is calling into question some of the fundamental assumptions upon 
which intellectual property (“IP”) law rests.2 
AI has become a hot topic in recent years. In 1996, IBM’s computer called “Deep Blue” 
made international headlines by defeating world chess champion Garry Kasparov in 
Philadelphia.3 Five years later, in 2011, IBM’s AI called “Watson” became the 
champion of the game show “Jeopardy!”.4 Most recently, in 2016, Google’s AI called 
“AlphaGo” defeated a human champion of “Go”, the 2500-year-old Chinese strategy 
game that is much more complex than chess.5 From the point of view of this thesis, 
even more interesting is the progress made by AI in the creative field. The advance in 
                                                 
1 Peter Groves, Copyright and design law – a Question of Balance. Graham & Trotman, London (1991), 
p. 1-2. In the 1990’s, the rise of personal computers forced copyright law to accommodate software and 
computer databases and consequently, the Software Directive 91/250/EC and the Database directive 
96/9/EC were issued. 
2 Timothy Butler, ‘Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence’ (1982) 4 
Cinn/Ent Law Journal 707-747, p. 747. 
3 Weber, Bruce ‘Swift and Slashing, Computer Topples Kasparov’ N.Y. Times, 12 May 1997. Available 
at <www.nytimes.com/1997/05/12/nyregion/Swift-and-slashing-coputer-topples-kasparov.html>, 
accessed on 30 June 2018. 
4 Markoff, John ‘Computer Wins ’Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not’ N.Y. Times, 16 February 2011. Available 
at <www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html.>, accessed on 15 July 2018. 
5 McAfree, Andrew & Brynjolfsson, Eric ‘Where Computers Defeat Humans, and Where They Can’t’ 
N.Y. Times, 16 March 2016. Available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/opinion/where-computer-
defeat-humans-and-where-they-cant.html.>, accessed on 10 June 2018. 
2 
 
AI has made machine-generation of artistic works reality. Today, AI is able to generate 
various type of art, such as music6, literature7 and paintings8. 
Use of technological tools in the creation of art as such is not a new phenomenon. 
Various computer programs and AI systems have been used as a tool for creating art by 
human authors for a relatively long time.9 Using AI as a tool for creating a work of art 
rises no issue regarding copyright as the EU copyright law is technology neutral.10 
Technology neutrality means that the copyright protection is not only extended to the 
traditional artistic and literary works, but also works produced by using various new 
technologies, such as computers, robots and AI systems.11 Thus, similar as an artist uses 
a pen to draw, the artist can use technological tool to create a work. For instance, 
Microsoft Word can be used to write an essay and digital camera can be used to take a 
photo.12 
However, today’s AI systems are not used merely as tools for human authors. The 
modern AI systems, relying on machine learning and neural network technology, are 
able to generate artistic works independently, mimicking human intelligence. The works 
generated independently by modern AI-systems, with no human input in the creation 
process, are referred as “AI-generated works” in this thesis. For instance, an UK based 
company “JukeDeck” uses neural network technology to produce music for commercial 
                                                 
6 For instance, Google’s AI called “WaveNet” is able to generate music by analyzing the given set of 
classical music. Van Den Oord, Aaron et al. ‘Wavenet: A generative Model for Raw Audio’ ArXiv, 9 
September 2016. Available at <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.03499.pdf>, accessed on 1 October 2018. 
7 For instance, a short-form novel generated by AI made it through the first round of screening for a 
national literary prize in Japan called the Nikkei Hoshi Shinichi Literary Award. See Japan Times 2016. 
8 E-David was a robot that competed alongside 25 other artistic robots in the robot art competition. The 
Guardian 2016: ‘Vincent van Bot: the robots turning their hand to art’ 19 April 2016. Available at 
<www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/apr/19/robot-art-competition-e-david-cloudpainter-bitpaintr>, 
accessed on 9 August 2018. 
9 Already in 1974, the US Congress established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (CONTU). It was set the task of studying, among other topical technology issues 
such as issue of authorship of computer-generated works. In its final report, CONTU stated that a 
computer cannot be the author of works created through its use, and that the user of the program is the 
author. See the CONTU Report 1978. In the US, using AI as a tool was discussed in the Commission 
1988 Green Paper, in which it was stated that a human being can use a computer program as a tool for 
creating a work of art and this should not arise any issue regarding copyrights. Commission, ‘Copyright 
and the Challenge of Technology – Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action’ COM (88) 172 final, 7 
June 1988. (Green Paper 1988), p. 197, 5.6.25 & 5.6.26. 
10 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics’ 2015/2103 (INL), p. 9. 
11 Pirkko-Liisa Haarmann, Immateriaalioikeus (Talentum, Helsinki 2014), p. 47. 
12 Anne Fitzgerald & Tim Seidenspinner, ‘Copyright and Consumer-Generated Materials – Is It Time to 





purposes. The company provides AI-generated music for its clients for various 
purposes, such as background music in videos or business events.13  Moreover, an 
auction house Christie’s is preparing to auction off its first AI-generated artwork that 
has been generated by an AI system relying on artificial neural network technology. The 
painting is expected to go for a figure between 8.000 and 11.500 dollars.14 
Another well-known example of AI-generation is the Project Next Rembrandt. In April 
2016, the Project Next Rembrandt unveiled a painting created by an AI algorithm that 
mimics the subject matter and style of the famous Dutch artist almost indistinguishably. 
In the project, the AI algorithm was trained on 346 Rembrandt’s paintings, after which 
it was asked to generate a new painting that should look like “Caucasian male, with 
facial hair, between 20-40 years old, wearing dark clothing with a collar, wearing a hat 
and facing to the right”. The machine selected common features in the data set and 
generated a “typical” Rembrandt portrait than was novel and unique.15 
What is new is that human input is missing in the creation process of these new type of 
AI-generated art works.  Hence, AI-generated works impose challenges for copyright 
law, as copyright law has traditionally protected only the works created by human 
beings. Currently, the EU copyright regulation says nothing about the protection of AI-
generated works, where human author in the creation process cannot be established. 
Hence, when AI systems generate work of art independently, the question of whether 
these type of new art works are protected under the EU copyright arises. 
Copyright is a type of IP right that grants the creator of original work exclusive rights to 
determine whether, and under what conditions, the work may be used by others. The 
creator can use the work for commercial purposes, such as to sell, distribute or license 
rights to the work.16 Thus, one might think why the copyright protection of AI-
generated works is even worth to discuss as after all, the intuition suggests that AI 
systems do not need copyright protection, as they are only machines, with no feelings or 
                                                 
13 Jukedeck.com/about. Available at <www.jukedeck.com/about>, accessed on 5 October 2018. 
14 The algorithm was fed with a data set of 15 000 portraits painted between the 14th century to the 20th, 
after which the algorithm made a new image based on the set. See <www.christies.com/features/a-
collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-machine>, accessed on 3 October 2018. 
15 The Project Next Rembrandt. Available at <www.nextrembrandt.com/>, accessed on 10 July 2018. 




need for monetary reward. However, this thesis will argue against this intuitive 
assumption and claim that an adequate protection regime should be established for the 
AI-generated works similarly than for the works generated by humans. Even though AI 
systems do not need protection, there are humans behind the machines that need to be 
incentivized. 
The EU aims to be the most advanced society what is comes to AI in the future. The 
announcement of the European Commission published on 25 April 2018 regarding the 
series of measures to put AI to use in the EU and boost its competitiveness states: 
“Just as the steam engine and electricity did in the past, AI is transforming our 
world. It presents new challenges that Europe should meet together in order for 
AI to succeed and work for everyone. We need to invest at least €20 billion by 
the end of 2020. The Commission is playing its part: today, we are giving a 
boost to researchers so that they can develop the next generation of AI 
technologies and applications, and to companies, so that they can embrace and 
incorporate them.”17 
In order to EU reach its goal, the legislative environment regarding the AI-generation 
needs to be clarified. Unclear legislative environment has negative impact on 
investments and hence, the development of the society. 
This need to clarify legal implications of advancements in AI have been already 
addressed in the level of EU. In January 2017, the Committee on Legal Affairs of 
European Parliament published a report with Recommendation to the Commission on 
Civil Law Rules on Robotics, stating: 
“Robotics and AI have become one of the most prominent technological trends 
of our century. The fast increase of their use and development brings new and 
difficult challenges to our society. The road from the industrial sector to the civil 
society environment obliges a different approach on these technologies, as 
                                                 
17 Commission, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Commission outlines a European approach to boost investment 
and set ethical guidelines’. Press release, Brussels, 25 April 2018. Available at 




robots and AI would increase their interaction with humans in very diverse 
fields.”18 
Copyright protection of AI-generated works forms one of these new and difficult 
challenges that needs to be solved. Today, both individual artists19 and technology 
companies20 are using AI systems in the creation of various type of art works.  
Copyright protection is crucial for the development of art and dissemination of artistic 
works in the society – the same principle apply in the AI-generated works. 
Today, more and more valuable art works are generated by AI systems and the market is 
eager to move these type of art works. If the copyright legislation remains unclear in 
respect of the AI-generated works, the artists have no incentive to generate work of art 
by using advanced AI systems and consequently have the companies incentive to invest 
in AI technology and generation of these new valuable AI systems. This in turn will 
have a negative impact on the creation and dissemination of valuable art works in the 
EU. Hence, in order to the EU maintain its competitiveness in the global market, the 
copyright legislation regarding AI-generated works needs to be clarified.21 The central 
objective of this thesis is to establish that the protection regime for AI-generated works 
is needed as well as propose a new model to be used in order to protect the works 
generated by AI. 
                                                 
18 European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Civil Law Rules on Robotics. 2015/2103 (INL), p. 27. 
19 For example, Munich-based Mario Klingemann uses trained AI algorithm for production of paintings 
that are melting, many eyed grotesques that are often compared to the works of Francis Bacon. Gaskin, 
Sam, ‘When Art Created by Artificial Intelligence Sells, Who Gets Paid?, 17 September 2018. Available 
at <www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-art-created-artificial-intelligence-sells-paid>, accessed on 27 
September 2018. 
20 Especially large multinationals, such as Facebook, Apple and IBM have recently invested heavily on 
AI technology. 
21 This issue regarding the lack of protection of AI-generated works has already been recognized at the 
EU level. In the resolution of 16 February 2017, the Members of European Parliament calls upon the 
Commission to address whether and how the current IP legislation should be altered to accommodate the 
advancement in AI. European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics’ 2015/2103 (INL), p. 9.  
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1.2 Research questions and limitations 
The first main research question of this thesis is ‘are the AI-generated works eligible for 
protection under the current EU copyright regulation?’ Currently, the EU copyright 
regulation says either nothing about the protection of these type of AI-generated works, 
where human author cannot be established. According to the EU legislation, the 
copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the relevant protected work. 
However, EU copyright law does not define the term author and the question is whether 
a machine can be regarded as an author. In order to provide the answer to the first 
research question, it needs to be looked into the originality requirement established by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that is the fundamental requirement 
for copyright protection in the EU. 
It will be claimed that only human beings can be regarded as authors under the current 
EU copyright law and hence, the AI-generated works are not currently eligible for 
protection. In order to a work to be protected, sufficient human input needs to be 
established in the creation process. Hence, the follow-up question for the first research 
question is ‘what is the sufficient human input in the creation process in order to a work 
to be protected under current EU copyright regulation?’ In order to answer this question, 
the case law of the CJEU will be analysed. 
Further, as the AI-generated works with no sufficient human input involved in the 
creation process are currently in the public domain, the second main research question 
of this thesis is ‘should the AI-generated works be protected?’ The theoretical 
justifications of copyright, the value for the protection for the society as well as 
practical considerations will be analysed in order to answer this question. It will be 
claimed that the AI-generated works, being indistinguishable from the work generated 
by humans, are at least as valuable for the society as the work created by humans and 
hence, the production of such works should be guaranteed by providing adequate 
copyright protection. 
Further, it will be analysed for whom and how the rights in these works should be 
vested. Hence, the follow-up question for the second research question is ‘who should 
be the owner of copyrights in the AI-generated works and how should the ownership be 




the programmer and the user. It will be resulted that the ownership should be allocated 
to the user of the AI system. 
Moreover, it will be looked into the legislations of other jurisprudences in order to find 
a feasible solution for this ownership allocation in practice. It will be suggested that in 
order to allocate the ownership to the user, the work-for-hire doctrine under which the 
authorship in the AI-generated work would be directly vested to the user of the AI 
system should be issued at the EU level. 
AI and robotics in general include increasing number of issues in the field of IP law. 
This thesis is limited to the copyright regulation in the EU and does not include other 
fields of European IP rights. In this thesis, it is assumed that copyright regulation would 
serve the best framework for protection of AI-generated works and therefore, the 
possibilities to apply other protection regimes such as patent protection, trade secrets or 
licensing agreements will be not discussed. For further references, Ryan Abbott22 has 
discussed the patentability of AI-generated works and Sam Ricketson23 has discussed 
the possibility in applying the database protection in respect of AI-generated works. 
Additionally, the considerations regarding potential “sui generis” protection for the AI-
generated works will be not discussed in this thesis. Applicability of sui generis 
protection for AI-generated works has been discussed for instance by Synodinou.24 
The thesis will focus on the current and the near-future level of AI and will not take into 
consideration science fiction concepts such as an artificial super intelligence, which is 
even smarter than humans are in practically every field, including scientific creativity, 
general wisdom and social skills. Currently, this type of AI can currently be recognized 
only from science fiction, in robots such as “Ex Machina” and hence, it remains 
                                                 
22 Ryan Abbott, ‘I think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law’ (2016) 57 
Boston College Law Rev, 1079-1126. 
23 Sam Ricketson, ‘Reflections on Authorship and the Meaning of a “Work” In Australian and Singapore 
Copyright Law’ (2012) 24 Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 820-851. 
24 Tatiana Eleni Synodinou, ‘AI Intelligence: Criteria for Protection’ (2018), available at 
<https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/synodinou-ai-and-ownership.pdf>, 
accessed on 20 October 2018. 
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hypothetical.25 The thesis will not include the philosophical discussion about 
personhood of AI either. 
Moreover, the infringement issue is another highly interesting and important topic 
related to AI-generation that would require further academic research. This issue arises 
as AI systems relying on machine learning and neural network technology uses large 
amount of data that may contain also copyrighted materials in the generation of works. 
However, due to the limited pages of the thesis, the infringement issue will not be 
analysed further but mentioned only in the sideline debate. Several scholars, such as 
Grimmelmann26 and Sobel27 have written about this topic. 
1.3 Research method and sources 
The method of the thesis is legal dogmatic method. The aim of the legal dogmatic 
method is to interpret and systematize the substance of existing law. Further, the legal 
dogmatic research intends to provide justifications for interpretation of the existing 
law.28 Especially, as regard as the first main research question, namely ‘are the AI-
generated works eligible for protection under the current EU copyright regulation?’, and 
its follow-up question, namely ‘what is the sufficient human input in the creation 
process in order to a work to be protected under current EU copyright regulation?’, the 
aim is to derive answer by interpreting the current legislation and case law. 
As regard as the second main research question, namely ‘should the AI-generated works 
be protected?’ and its follow-up question, namely ‘who should be the owner of 
copyrights in the AI-generated works and how would the ownership be vested?’, de lege 
ferenda analysis is carried out. The de lege ferenda analysis seeks to propose legislative 
                                                 
25 The consensus among the researcher is that AI equal to human intelligence will exist in the 2024 at the 
earliest. See e.g. Gonçalo Carriço, ‘The EU and Artificial Intelligence: A Human-Centered Perspective 
(2018) 17(1) European View, 29–36, p. 30. 
26 See James Grimmelmann, ‘Copyright for Literate Robots’ (2016) 101 Iowa Law Review, 658-681. 
27 See Benjamin Sobel, ‘Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis’ (2017) Columbia Journal of Law and 
Arts, 1-50. 
28 Aulis Aarnio, Luentoja lainopillisen tutkimuksen teoriasta (Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisen 




improvements and considers how the law should be.29 Hence, the second part of this 
thesis provides de lege ferenda interpretation and proposal for legislative revision with 
respect to the EU copyright regulation for AI-generated works. Moreover, legal history 
of copyright law will be looked into at some extent in order to understand the originality 
requirement and the human author requirement in the EU. 
As the thesis primarily concerns with the EU copyright regulation, the main legal 
sources are EU copyright directives and the case law of the CJEU. In addition, 
international treaties as well as EU level official papers are used as source material. 
Moreover, the legal provisions and national courts’ case law from other jurisprudences 
are examined in order to broader the understanding on the topic as well examine how 
the issues under analysis have been solved in other jurisprudences. However, even 
though the thesis includes some comparative aspects, not full comparative analysis is 
carried out. 
Moreover, the academic articles form an essential part of source material in this thesis. 
However, as there is not much academic writings related to topic available in the light 
EU regulation yet, the majority of academic writings analyzed in this thesis are from 
common law tradition. Hence, the differences in the legal traditions between common 
law and civil law countries needs to be carefully kept in mind. Moreover, Internet 
sources are used as source material at some extent. As it is a question of relatively new 
phenomenon, both academic and internet sources form a relatively important part of the 
source material. For the same reason, traditional printed literature does not play a 
significant role as source material of this thesis. 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides necessary background 
information in order to follow the analysis of this thesis. The core development as well 
as relevance of the topic are presented. Moreover, the research questions and limitations 
of the thesis are discussed, as well as the research methods applied and source material 
                                                 
29 Tieteen termipankki 18.10.2018: Oikeustiede: oikeustieteellinen tutkimus. Available at < 




used to support author’s claims are presented. In the end of the first chapter, the 
structure of the thesis is shortly gone through in order to provide a general overview of 
the thesis to the reader. 
The second chapter of this thesis provides the reader to introduction to the AI. First, the 
definitions and the history of AI are discussed. Second, the key concepts, namely the 
weak and soft AI are explained, as in order to follow the analysis of this thesis it is 
crucial to understand what type of AI is under analysis. Third, in order to provide to the 
reader a better understanding of the significance of the AI in our society, especially in 
the field of art, various practical examples in respect of what AI is capable of doing 
today in the field of creativity and art are provided. 
The third chapter provides the overview of the current legal framework of EU 
copyright. First, the legislative framework of copyright within the EU is presented at the 
extent that is necessary in respect of the analysis of this thesis. Hence, international 
treaties as well as directives are presented. Second, the copyright law justifications, 
namely the personhood theory, reward theory and incentive theory and their 
significance in the EU copyright framework are discussed. Moreover, the difference 
between civil law and common law traditions are shortly presented as this is important 
in order to follow the argumentation of the thesis. Third, requirements for copyright 
protection in the EU are presented, as one of these requirements, namely the originality 
requirement is in the core of the analysis in this thesis. 
The fourth chapter is the first main chapter of this thesis, in which the first research 
question and its follow-up question are analysed. First, this chapter aims to provide the 
answer to the question ‘are the AI-generated works eligible for protection under the 
current EU copyright regulation?’. The EU case law of originality, justifications of 
copyright protection as well as historical consideration will be analysed in order to 
provide the answer for this question. Second, it will be looked into ‘what is the 
sufficient human input in the creation process in order to a work to be protected under 
current EU copyright regulation?’, by looking into CJEU case law. 
The fifth chapter focuses on the analysis of the second main research question, namely 
‘should the AI-generated works be protected?’ and its follow-up question ‘who should 




vested?’ The question ‘should the AI-generated works be protected?’ is analysed in the 
light of copyright law justifications, in the light of societal benefit as well as in the light 
of practical considerations. As it will be found that the AI-generated works should be 
protected, it is discussed to whom of the following alternatives the rights should be 
allocated: the AI system, the programmer or the user. Moreover, it will be discussed 
how in practice the ownership allocation could be made. The work-for-hire doctrine is 
suggested as a solution in order to vest the ownership to the user. Both the positive sides 
and the challenges regarding the application of the doctrine are discussed. 
The sixth chapter summarizes the results of the thesis and presents the conclusions 
drawn from the research.  
2 WHAT IS AI? 
2.1 A short history of AI 
Yet today, there is no common definition of AI. Today’s dictionary definitions often 
focus on AI being a subfield of computer science that deals with the simulation of 
rational and human like behavior in computer based on statistical analysis. For example, 
the Oxford Living Dictionary gives the following definition: “the theory and 
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human 
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and 
translation between languages.” 30 
Even though the comprehensive agreement of the definition of AI has not been 
obtained, Nilsson has provided a definition accepted by the most of the academic 
scholars: 
                                                 
30 English Oxford Dictionaries: Definition of Artificial Intelligence. Available at < 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence>, accessed on 6 July 2018. 
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“AI is that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is 
that quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in 
its environment.”31 
In this thesis, AI refers also to artificial intelligent agents, AI systems that incorporate 
said simulation. 
AI is a relatively new phenomenon. Alan Turing laid down the foundation for AI 
research in 1950. Turing investigated whether a machine is capable of thinking and 
doing intelligent things, such as playing Chess.32 In the next decades, heavy investments 
in the research and development of AI technologies took place. However, by the 1980’s, 
the interest in AI technologies had significantly dropped and the funding dried as the 
field had not managed to achieve the practical success stories that had been promised.33 
The creation of AI programs boomed only after 1980’s, when algorithms were adopted 
to commercial use in the Internet search engines and online shops. In the last decades, 
AI research has certainly reached the success that was forecasted in the 1950’s. The rise 
of Internet has provided the large amount of data that is needed to train the AI systems 
and development more reliable hardware have made robots easier to build.34 
Today, AI has secured a more prominent position as a driver of innovations and 
economic growth in our society. Different surveys have revealed that 62 % of 
enterprises will apply AI by 2018 and the market of AI will grow from 8 billion dollars 
in 2016 to more than 47 billion dollars in 2020.35 AI enables the development of 
commercial technologies that have a substantial impact on everyday life. Especially the 
major technological companies, such as IBM, Facebook, Apple and Amazon invest 
heavily in the research, development and commercialization of AI application. For 
instance, ‘Siri’, a voice-activated computer developed by Apple helps people to find 
                                                 
31 John Nils Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (Stanford 
University Press 2010), p. 13 
32 Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950) 59 (236) Lix Mind, New Series, 433-460. 
Available at  <www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf>, accessed on 5 September 2018. 
33 Peter Stone, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, One Hundred Year Study on Artificial 
Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel’ (2016) Stanford University, p. 51. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gil Press: Top 10 Hot Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technologies, 3 January 2017. Available at 
<www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/01/23/top-10-hotartificial-intelligence-ai-




information and gives directions. Moreover, ‘Alexa’, a smart home hub developed by 
Amazon helps people to shop, schedule appointments and set alarms whereas ‘Tesla’, a 
smart self-driving car can soon be a better driver than a human. 
As the pace of digital advanced technology continues to accelerate and AI achieves 
digital tools that formerly were thought impossible, many field are beginning to feel 
pressure.36 The importance of AI has been recognized also at the level of EU. In the 
resolution of 16 February 2017, the European Parliament expressed the expected impact 
of AI to the Commission: 
“Humankind stands on the threshold of an era whenever more sophisticated 
robots, bots, androits and other manifestations or AI seem to be poised to 
unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely to leave no stratum of 
society untouched.”37 
The foundation for AI research was laid down less than 70 years ago. The development 
in the field of AI technology has been very fast and it is likely that it will only 
accelerate. Our current law has not been issued at this technological development in 
mind hence, it is crucial to start focus how we want to face the emergence in the AI 
technology in the field or law. 
2.2 Weak and strong AI 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to make distinction between the works 
generated on the one hand by so-called “weak AI” and on the other hand by so-called 
“strong AI”. While early AI, namely “weak AI”, was merely able to create programs 
                                                 
36 For example in auto industry, the advanced robots are replacing humans in more and more aspects of 
the production. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, ‘Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, And 
Accountability in the 3D Era – The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here – A New Model’ (2017) 
Mich. St. Law Review, 659-726, p. 725.  
37 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics’ 2015/2103 (INL), p. 1. 
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tailored to the narrow function required, the newly emerged “strong AI” fosters 
innovative thinking and logical reasoning abilities within the machine itself.38 
As regard as “weak AI”, the machine is programmed to act human, entailing that a 
programmer has direct control over the output of the system. The “weak AI” systems 
are not fully autonomous and therefore, not truly “intelligent” or human like.39 There is 
no issue of copyright protection of works generated by “weak AI”, as a sufficient 
human involvement in the creation process can be established. The machine is not able 
to act truly independently, making “creative choices” by itself. For instance, Harold 
Cohen’s software called “Aaron” is probably one of the best-known example of the 
early efforts of computer generation by “weak AI” system. The user of “Aaron” is able 
to create visual and unique art by running the program, with no other user-input than 
pressing a button.40 However, this early attempt of art generation algorithms relies 
heavily on the input of the programmer, who determines the desirable predetermined 
output of the program by programming certain code. 
However, this thesis focuses on the copyright protection of works generated by “strong 
AI” systems. These works are referred as “AI-generated works”.  “Strong AI” aims to 
get a machine to “think” for itself. Randomness and a sense of autonomy are built into 
the “strong AI” systems, causing the human connection to the output to be much more 
distant. The development of “strong AI” is the reason why AI has emerged as a 
profound influence on society’s development. The “strong AI” systems have the 
potentiality to be enormously useful in many areas of society and it is predicted that 
                                                 
38 In addition to the division between the “weak AI” and “strong AI”, the following three categories of AI 
are often referred in the academic literature: artificial narrow intelligence, artificial general intelligence 
and artificial super intelligence. The artificial narrow intelligence is similar to “weak AI”; the artificial 
general intelligence refers to an AI that is as smart as a human and able to perform any intellectual task as 
we do with the capacity to understand and reason about its environment; and the artificial super 
intelligence refers to a machine that is smarter than a human in practically every field, including scientific 
creativity, general wisdom and social skills. Yanisky-Ravid (n 36), p. 675. 
39 Erica Palmerini, ‘Regulating Emerging Robotics Technologies in Europe: Robotics Facing Law and 
Ethics’ (2014) European Commission CORDIS Projects and Results Regulating Emerging Robotic 
Technologies in Europe: Robotics facing Law and Ethics. Available at 
<www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/documents/robolaw_d6.2_guidelinesregulatingrobotics_20140922.pdf
>, accessed on 10 September 2018, p. 168. 
40 Samples of works created by “Aaron” and a copy of “Aaron” program may be downloaded from 




these systems will do more and more work that humans cannot or want to do in the 
future.41 
The “strong AI” systems rely on machine learning. Machine learning is a subgroup of 
AI that illustrates the idea of autonomously acting computers without being 
programmed explicitly for each scenario.42  First, system relying on machine learning 
receives training data. After receiving the training data, the learning algorithm analyzes 
similarities and differences of this data based on statistical symbols. After analyzing the 
data, the learning algorithm is able to create a work that shares a closeness to the 
training data but still is novel. Hence, machine learning allows AI systems to act 
independently and human like, allowing them to make autonomous and “creative” 
decisions.43 
The modern machine learning relies on artificial neural network technology. The 
artificial neural networks attempt to mimic the structure of biological neutral networks 
like human brain. A system relying on artificial neural network technology absorbs and 
distributes the information processing capacity to groups of receptors that operate like 
neurons. The receptors find and create connections and similarities within the processed 
data.44 For example, Google Translate is an example of a system that employs artificial 
neural network technology in functioning. Google Translate “learns” from experience 
and improves its algorithm through artificial neural networks that are trained but not 
programmed with specific procedural algorithms.45 
In the field of art, another example of a “strong AI” system that relies on artificial 
neural network technology is Google’s visualization tool “Deep Dream”. “Deep Dream” 
                                                 
41 The use of AI in medical industry and the emergence of care robots provide an example how use of AI 
helps people and increase the quality of life. Currently, the expected ageing of the population over the 
next 50 years raises considerable concerns for EU. There are 80 million people in Europe suffering a mild 
to severe disability and requiring measures to tackle physical, legal and social obstacles in their daily 
lives. Advance in research and development in personal care robots is predicted to tackle these 
challenges. Palmerini (n 39), p. 168. 
42 See Machine Learning Department, Garnegie Mellon University. Available at <www.ml.cmu.edu/.>, 
accessed on 10 October 2018. 
43 Yanisky-Ravid (n 36), p. 677. 
44 Ibid, p. 675. 
45 Gideon, Lewis-Kraus: ‘The Great A.I. Awakening’ New York Times Magazine, 14 December 2016. 




uses artificial neural networks to create unique, rare and disorganized images.46 By 
adopting machine learning mathematical methods, “Deep Dream” transforms a pre-
existing image, mimics human intelligence in functioning and makes decisions how to 
transform the input based on an algorithm. What is novel in artificial neural network 
system is that the algorithm choose what to enlarge in the image modification in order 
to make the result unpredictable and novel. As a result, new images that do not bear 
resemblance to the originals are produced. Most importantly, they are not the result of 
creative decisions by the programmers, but rather they are produced by the algorithm 
itself. The researcher explains: 
“Instead of exactly prescribing which feature we want the network to amplify, 
we can let the network make that decision. In this case, we simply feed the 
network an arbitrary image or photo and let the network analyze the picture. We 
then pick a layer and ask the network to enhance whatever it detected. Each 
layer of the network deals with features at a different level of abstraction, so the 
complexity of features we generate depends on which layer we choose to 
enhance.”47 
The UK based company JukeDeck, an example mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis, produces music by using artificial neural network technology and provides this 
AI-generated music pieces to its customer for various purposes, such as background 
music in business events and games. AI systems relying on artificial neural networks 
produce music by learning from examples of classical music pieces and generate a full 
musical composition in response without human input.48 
Moreover, AI-generated newspaper articles have become reality.49 For example, a 
software “Quill” generates newspaper articles by analyzing data, identifying relevant 
facts and using natural language generation to assemble a narrative that is 
indistinguishable from a human-written one. The user of “Quill” only enter the required 
                                                 
46 A collection of Deep Dream images can be found: <http://deepdreamgenerator.com/gallery/public/best-
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subject of the article and press the button.50 In an effort to increase the efficiency of 
news researching and to better personalizing access to news, researches have recently 
undertaken to create a great number of AI systems that have the ability to summarize 
the news that they gather and generate the news even faster and more efficiently.51  
Additionally, the market is eager to move the visual AI-generated works, such as 
paintings. A London based artist Memo Akten was among the first artists to sell an AI 
artwork, at the price of 8.000 dollars at an auction hosted in San Francisco in 2016.52 
Moreover, as already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the Christie’s auction 
house will auction off its first AI-generated artwork on October 2018. The algorithm 
was fed with a data set of 15 000 portraits painted between the 14th century to the 20th, 
after which the algorithm made a new image based on the set. The painting is expected 
to go for a figure between 8.000 and 11.500 dollars.53 
 
These are just few examples of AI-generation today. “Strong AI” systems are able to 
produce works of art in almost every copyrightable medium. Taken into account the 
current technological development, it is likely that the number of AI-generated works 
will only increase in the future. 
3 EU COPYRIGHT REGULATION 
3.1 Legislative framework 
Copyright law is international field of law. The most important international agreement 
in the field of copyright is the Berne Convention from year 1886.54 By 2018, in total of 
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176 states were parties to the Berne Convention.55 The other important conventions in 
the field of IP law are the Rome Convention, TRIPS agreement and World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties, namely the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).56 
Within the EU, the Copyright law is fragmented field of law: there is no common EU 
copyright.57 The copyright and related right are protected under the national laws of 
individual Member States. However, the regulatory framework of copyright and related 
rights has been harmonized through 11 directives.58 The ultimate goal of harmonization 
in the EU level is to ensure the free movement of copyrightable works within the 
internal market.59 
Many of the EU directives reflect Member States' obligations under the Berne 
Convention and the Rome Convention, as well as the obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement and the WIPO Internet Treaties, WCT and WPPT. Therefore, even though 
the copyright regulation within the EU is national, as result of the harmonization, the 
copyright legislations of the Member States do not differ significantly from each 
others.60 
The most important EU directives in the analysis of this thesis are the Information 
Society Directive 2001/29/EC61, the Software Directive 2009/24/EC62, the Database 
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Directive 96/9/EC63 and the Term Directive 2006/116/EC64. These directives are shortly 
presented in the following. 
The Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC (“Infosoc Directive”) is one of the most 
important directive in the field of copyright law in the EU. The Infosoc Directive 
2001/29/EC establishes the basic obligations of Member States with respect of the 
copyright and related rights, building on the obligations imposed by the Berne 
Convention and the Rome Convention, and implementing the further requirements of 
the WIPO Internet treaties. It can be stated that the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC 
represents the closest thing that currently exists to a complete European copyright and 
related rights code.65 
The Software Directive 2009/24/EC provides protection regime for computer programs. 
Software is protected as ‘literary works’ under the Software Directive 91/250/EC. The 
objective of the Software Directive 2009/24/EC is to harmonize Member States' 
legislation regarding the protection of computer programs in order to create a legal 
environment that will afford a degree of security against unauthorized reproduction of 
such programs.66 Hence, under the Software Directive 91/250/EC, the programmer of 
the underlying software of AI system is granted with the protection in respect of the 
program itself. 
The Database Directive 96/9/EC harmonizes copyright law applicable to the structure 
and arrangement of the contents of databases (“original” databases). Moreover, it 
creates an exclusive “sui generis” right for database producers, valid for 15 years, to 
protect their investment of time, money and effort, irrespective of whether the database 
is in itself innovative (“non-original” databases). Hence, on the contrary of European 
Copyright tradition that has been traditionally regarded moral right and human centric, 
the Database directive 96/9/EC has been clearly drafted in commercial interests in mind. 
                                                 
63 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, [1996] OJ L 77/20. (“Database Directive 96/9/EC”) 
64 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the 
term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, [2006], OJ L 372/12; originally published as 
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and 
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65 Pila & Torremans (n 16), p. 247. 
66 Software Directive 91/250/EC, preamble 13.  
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The Term Directive 2006/116/EC harmonizes the terms of protection of copyright and 
related rights. The Directive establishes a total harmonization of the period of protection 
for each type of work and each related right in the Member States. The term of 
protection established by the Term Directive 2006/116/EC is 70 years after the death of 
the author for works and 50 years after the event setting the time running for related 
rights. Furthermore, it deals with other issues, such as the protection of previously 
unpublished works, of critical and scientific publications and of photographic works.67 
In addition, the following copyright directives exist in the EU: Directive 2014/26/EU on 
Management of Copyrights and Related Rights; Directive 2012/28/EU on Orphan 
Works; Directive 2006/115/EC on Rental and Lending Rights; Directive 93/83/EEC on 
Satellite and Cable; Directive 2001/84/EC on Resale Rights; Directive 87/54/EC on 
Protection of Semi-Conductor Topographies; and Directive 2004/48/EC on 
Enforcement. However, these directives are not relevant in the scope of the discussion 
in the thesis and hence, are not discussed further. 
In addition to EU directives, the case law of CJEU plays a significant role in 
interpretation, harmonization and enforcement of EU law. In the last years, the CJEU 
has developed a substantive body of case law interpreting the provisions of the 
directives. This has significantly contributed to the consistent application of the 
copyright rules across the EU.68 For instance the notion of ‘originality’ that is important 
in the analysis of this thesis, has been established through case law rather than 
directives. 
There is no specific legislation or case law regarding AI-generated works in the EU. 
The EU Commission addressed the challenges posed by computer creation in the 1988 
Green Paper. The Commission stated that the basis of all copyright protection is the 
exercise of sufficient skill and labor, and, therefore, the Commission inclined to the 
view that it is the user of the AI system who is entitled to the protection and the AI 
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system is only as a tool.69 This statement is however outdate and does not apply to the 
“strong AI” systems as such. 
3.2 Purpose of copyright 
Copyrights are limited-term exclusionary rights that subsist automatically in authorial 
works such as poems, paintings, writings and musical.70 The roots of copyrights can be 
tracked already to the classical Roman period, where the idea of authorial property was 
recognized. According to the Roman law principle of “accession”, if a person painted a 
picture on another person’s canvas, he or she thereby acquired ownership of the canvas. 
Hence, from the earliest time an act of authorship has been recognized in the Europe as 
capable of supporting property rights.71 
The world’s first civil and common law copyright enactment, the English Statute of 
Anne, was introduced in 1709. The purpose of Statute of Anne was to encourage the 
writing of books that would be useful to society and to prevent unauthorized copying. 
The Statute of Anne reflects the Lockean idea of individualized property rights and the 
birth of the two-fold role of copyright as both the incentive for creativity and access to 
free works.72 
Although the Statute of Anne was first meant to be primarily a booksellers’ bill and 
only secondarily an authors’ bill, the discourse of possessive individualism and original 
genius merged and as a result the idea of “romantic authorship” was emerged. Slowly 
the idea of “romantic authorship” became the center of the copyright system all around 
the Europe.73 By the 1880’s, all European states had introduced legislation recognizing 
and protecting the rights of author.74 Over times, various subject matters such as sound 
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recordings, films, broadcasts, videos and computer programs have left the marks in the 
copyright law.75 
Today, the purpose of copyright protection is to ensure that the authors of the works 
receive recognition, payment and protection for their works. Today, the EU Copyright 
tradition is dualistic and includes two type of rights: economic rights and moral rights. 
The economic rights include the author's exclusive right to impose the work on any use 
that may have financial significance, such as reproduction of copies, performance to the 
public, preparation of derivative works, displaying the work directly to the public, and 
distributing copies. As any other property, these rights can be transferred to another 
person or entity, through sale or licensing arrangements. The moral rights include the 
right to claim authorship of the work and the right to object to any derogatory action in 
relation to the work.76 Moral rights are not transferable but vest always to the original 
author of the work.77 
Historically, European countries, most of them belonging to civil law tradition, have put 
a lot of value for moral rights of the author. The philosophical position that authorship 
embodies rights of personhood can be seen from the French “droit d’auteur” degree of 
the 1790’s: 
“The most sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, and…the most 
personal of all properties, is the work of which is the fruit of the writer’s 
thoughts.” 
 
As a comparison, the common law approach to copyright, represented for instance in 
the US and UK, has traditionally been more utilitarian and emphasizes the economic 
rights of the author.78 The common law policies are based on a comparison of costs and 
                                                 
75 Hector MacQueen & Charlotte Waelde & Laurie Graeme, Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law 
and Policy (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 34. 
76 Commission, ‘Strategy, Digital Single Market, Policies, Copyright’. Last update 17 July 2018. 
Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/copyright>, accessed on 9 August 2018. 
77 Robert A Jacobs, ‘Work-For-Hire and the Moral Right Dilemma in the European Community: A U.S. 
Perspective’ (1993) 29 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 29-79, p. 49. 




benefits, and the primary emphasis of copyright policies in on the advancement of 
public welfare.79 
However, the harmonization of international laws has created a melding of these two 
approaches and today, it can be said that also the EU copyright regulation relies to a 
greater extent on economic justifications.80 Incentives to create, to invest in creativity, 
and to disseminate works for the general benefit of society has become an important 
justification for copyright protection also in the EU.81 
3.3 Justifications for protection 
Copyrights are exclusive rights: the existence of copyright in a particular work restricts 
the use that can be made of the work. Balancing the rights and interests of copyright 
authors and right holders with the rights and interests of third parties and the public has 
always been at the heart of IP law.82 One could ask why to grant copyright at all? Why 
we cannot release new works directly to the public domain and let everyone enjoy the 
fruits of intellectual creations? The justifications for IP seek to answer these questions.83 
There are several theories justifying the IP protection presented in the academic 
literature. The personhood theory, rewarding theory and incentive theory are discussed 
in the following as these theories are the most prominent in the light of the EU 
copyright regulation.84 
According to personhood theory, intellectual products are seen as manifestation of their 
creators’ personality. This theory emphasizes the right of individuals to protection of 
their personhood and personal autonomy. Through the process of creation, a person 
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comes to occupy the product that he or she creates as an extension of himself. This 
theory of IP has particular value for EU copyright law, and it is reflected in author’s 
moral right regime. For example, within the EU law, copyright is granted automatically, 
with no need for application or registration, in and only in authorial works, defined as 
works that express an author’s own intellectual creation and bear the personal mark.85 
According to the reward theory, the property rights are granted because the creators of 
intellectual products deserve them. According to this theory, the copyright is considered 
as legal articulation of thankfulness to the author for doing something more for the 
whole society than needed.86 It is regarded that those who invest resources, such as 
energy, money and time for creating intellectual products have certain financial or 
personal need to be rewarded on their investment. Reward theory regards that this need 
accordingly fulfilled by the recognition of property rights in respect of the products 
created. 
The reward theory finds backing in the notions of self-ownership stated by John Locke. 
According to Locke’s theory, individuals have natural rights of ownership in respect of 
their bodies. This right in turn reaches through to the products they create in existence 
of their labour. Based on this theory, when a person takes some materials that is 
available in the pool of commonly owned resource, such as an idea, and mixes it with 
his or her labour to make a product, the person receives a natural right as regard as that 
product.87 
The reward theory finds also direct expression in EU Copyright regulation. According 
to the recital 10 of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC: 
“If authors or performs are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have 
to receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as much producers in 
order to be able to finance this work. The investment required to produce 
products such as phonograms, films or multimedia products, and services such 
as on demand services, is considerable. Adequate legal protection of intellectual 
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property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a 
reward and provide the opportunity for satisfactory returns on this investment.” 
The incentive theory represents the utilitarian approach for IP. Incentive theory 
proposes that the production and public dissemination of cultural objects such as books, 
music and art is an important and valuable activity for the society and this in such is the 
reasonable justification for the protection.88 The argument commonly made is that the 
grant of proprietary rights in respect of authorial works incentivizes investments in the 
creations and dissemination of those works.89 Thus, the incentive theory is based on the 
idea of what is good for the society as whole: the copyright is regarded benefitting the 
larger society and economy.90  In EU Copyright regulation, this argument finds direct 
expression in the recital 4 of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC: 
“A harmonized legal framework on copyright and related rights, through 
increased legal certainty and whole providing for a high level of protection of 
intellectual property, will foster substantial in creativity and innovation, 
including network infrastructure, and lean in turn to growth and increased 
competitiveness of European industry, both in the area of content provisions and 
information technology and more generally across a wide range of industrial and 
cultural sectors. This will safeguard employment and encourage new jobs 
creations.” 
Incentive theory proposes that without copyright protection, the production and 
dissemination of cultural objects would not take place at an optimal level. The 
production of the artistic works is often very costly and once they are published, they 
are ready to be copied. Consequently, without any protection, the competitors could 
easily reproduce the works without recouping the expense of its initial production.91 
To conclude, the personhood theory, reward theory and incentive theory together form 
the underlying rationale in the today’s EU copyright framework. However, as 
previously explained, the European states have traditionally justified copyright 
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protection on the basis of justifications that have a strong link to the moral rights, 
namely the personhood and reward theory, and only in the recent years the importance 
of the incentive arguments has emerged.92 
3.4 Requirements for protection 
In order to qualify for copyright protection under the EU copyright regulation, the work 
has to fulfil certain requirements. First, the work in question has to fall within a specific 
copyright-protected subject matter. The Berne Convention implies that in order to a 
work to be protected, it needs to be a production in the literary, scientific or artistic 
domain.93 Further, in order to qualify for protection, the work needs to be presented in 
fixed form: ideas, inventions and knowledge cannot be protected by copyrights.94 The 
work can be protected in its various forms meaning that for example, a written work 
may be presented both in oral and written form, obtaining protection in both forms.95 
The definition of copyright-protected subject matter has been traditionally interpreted 
broadly.96 As can be seen from the examples presented in the chapter 2.2., the AI 
systems are capable of producing various type of artistic works such as paintings, books 
and music that arguable fulfil the requirement of the copyright-protected subject matter. 
Moreover, dealing specifically with the computer-generated works, clarification can be 
found in the CJEU case BSA97. In the BSA, the CJEU was asked to determine if a 
computer graphical interface was a work in accordance to the definition set out in the 
EU copyright law. The court stated that “a graphical user interface can, as a work, be 
protected by copyright if it is the author’s own intellectual creation.”98 Thus, as the 
requirement of the copyright-protected subject matter is not likely to prevent AI-
generated works from copyright protection, this requirement is not analyzed further. 
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Second, in order to a work being subject to copyright protection, the requirement of 
originality needs to be met. The requirement of originality is a very strong prerequisite 
for the protection. However, no copyright directive exists that uniformly defines the 
requirement of originality for all type of copyright-protected subject matters. The 
requirement of originality is referred only in three copyright directives: the Art 1(3) of 
the Software Directive 91/250/EC, the Art 3(1) of the Database Directive 96/9/EC and 
the Art 6 of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC. All three directives constitute that in 
order to a work being eligible for protection, the work must be the “author’s own 
intellectual creation”.99  
Legislature being limited, the threshold of originality has been established through the 
case law of the CJEU. The threshold of originality was first time established in the 
landmark case Infopaq100. Infopaq achieved a full harmonization of the originality in the 
EU level and today, the originality has the same meaning no matter what is the subject 
matter of the protection. The CJEU decisions in BSA, Murphy101, Painer102 and Football 
Dataco103 have further clarified and enriched the EU meaning of originality. 
In Infopaq, it was concerned whether Infopaq, a company that by means of data capture 
process drew up summaries of articles from Danish newspapers and sent them by e-mail 
to its customers, was obliged to obtain consent from the right holders of the articles 
before reproduction them in part. It was stated by the CJEU that in order to a work 
being protected, the work shall be original in the sense that it is the “author’s own 
intellectual creation”.104 Moreover, the CJEU interestingly gave significant importance 
to the intellectual act of selection and arrangement of text snippers when evaluating the 
originality of the work. The CJEU held in Infopaq: 
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“Regarding the elements of such works covered by the protection, it should be 
observed that they consist of words which, considered in isolation, are not as 
such intellectual creation of the author who employs them. It is only through the 
choice, sequence and combination of those words that the author may express 
his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual 
creation.”105 
In the Infopaq, it was therefore regarded that the originators of the newspaper articles 
had exercised a chain of creative choices that made the text original in essence that they 
were the “author’s own intellectual creation”. 
In the already mentioned case BSA, the CJEU faced a question of whether a graphic user 
interface can be protected by copyright as an expression of the software itself. The 
CJEU ruled that the Software Directive 91/250/EC grants protection to certain parts of 
software but not the graphical user interface. However, the CJEU further stated that 
graphical user interface can be protected in its own right if it is an original work, namely 
the “author’s own intellectual creation”.106 In BSA, “the specific arrangement or 
configuration of all the components which form part of the graphic user interface” were 
named as possibly original, but not those parts that are determined by their technical 
function only.107 Hence, the CJEU concluded that merely following the requirement of 
technical function, an author cannot achieve “intellectual creation”, since his creativity 
is not possible to be expressed in an original manner.108 
In Murphy, the CJEU considered whether copyright could be claimed in sport event, 
namely a football game. It was stated negatively that football games and other sport 
events are so constrained by the rules that their rule-based nature leave “no creative 
freedom to the author” and hence, are not eligible for copyright protection.109 Further, 
the CJEU stated that a creation is to be considered as an intellectual, and hence original, 
if it is the result of the “author’s creative freedom”. By adopting such definition of 
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originality, the court thus added something to the concept of originality established in 
Infopaq.110 
In Painer, it was evaluated whether a photo-fit based on a photograph can be published 
without the right holder’s consent. The CJEU sought clarification whether the 
requirement of originality for photos in Art 6 of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC 
includes portraits. The CJEU again held that a work, namely a photograph, is eligible 
for protection if it is the “author’s own intellectual creation”. Moreover, the CJEU ruled 
that the work is the “author’s own intellectual creation” if the author was able to 
“express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative 
choices”. The CJEU stated that the author can make free and creative choices in several 
ways and at various points in the production. By making these creative choices, such as 
choosing the background, pose and the lightning, “the author of a portrait photograph 
can stamp the work created with his “personal touch’”.111  
In Football Dataco, the originality requirement was further clarified by offering a 
throughout explanation of the meaning of originality within the Database Directive 
96/9/EC.112 In Football Dataco, the CJEU dealt with a question of originality of fixture 
list of matches to be played in the English and Scottish football leagues in a year. In this 
case, the CJEU held that “the criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the 
selection or arrangement of the data which it contains, the author expresses his creative 
ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices…and thus stamps his 
“personal touch’”. The CJEU clarified further that “by contract, that criterion is not 
satisfied when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical considerations, 
rules or constraints which leave no room for creative freedom.”113 
Based on the case law established by the CJEU, it can be concluded that a work can be 
protected if such work is original in essence that it is the “author’s own intellectual 
creation”. Moreover, the work can be considered as the “author’s own intellectual 
creation” if the author makes “free and creative choices”, expresses a “personal touch” 
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while the process leaves the room for “creative freedom”.114 In the following chapter, it 
will be evaluated whether the AI-generated works meet the originality requirement and 
hence, are eligible for protection. 
4 ARE AI-GENERATED WORKS PROTECTED UNDER 
CURRENT EU COPYRIGHT LAW? 
4.1 Copyright protection of AI-generated works 
Whereas AI has been used as a tool for creation of art works by human authors for a 
long time, AI technology is constantly moving further into the realm of AI-generated 
works, where AI is not only assisting in creation process but generating works relatively 
autonomously. As it can be seen from the examples presented in the chapter 2.2., AI 
produces music, writes news stories and generates paintings by relying on artificial 
neural networks that have “taught themselves” to combine rules of literary, musical or 
artistic assembly after being “trained” on a database of pre-existing works. Examples 
such as photos generated by Google's visualization tool "Deep Dream", music generated 
by the company “JukeDeck” and the AI-generated painting sold in the Christie’s 
auction house present all new challenges for EU copyright law. 
In this type of AI creation, the role of the user of the AI system is reduced to relatively 
minor acts, such as merely causing the output to be generated by pressing the button of 
the AI system, training the algorithm or providing the input data to the AI system. All 
these type of acts can be regarded assisting in the nature whereas the AI system is 
independently responsible for the actual creation of the work. In the case of AI-
generation, the creative choices made by the AI system are akin to random or 
unpredictable from a human perspective, as they depend on the system and not on the 
humans behind it.115 In the absence of any human intervention relating to the 
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creativeness of the output, the question is whether the output independently generated 
by the AI qualifies for copyright protection as an original work. 
As the copyright-protected subject matter is similar to a work generated by a human, it 
could be argued that it should have the same status as a work created by a human 
regardless of the method of production. This argumentation can be supported by the 
principle of non-discrimination in EU copyright law. The principle of non-
discrimination refers to the right of an author to raise a claim when treated in a less 
favorable way than other authors in the same position.116 Based on this principle of 
copyright law, it could be claimed that it needs to be applied also to the copyright-
protected subject matter. Hence, based on this argumentation, an AI-generated work that 
is indistinguishable from a work made by a human should receive protection if the work 
would have been protected if a human created it. However, this analogue does not yet 
find any support in jurisprudence or other legal sources, and therefore cannot be given 
any weight in the analysis of current law.117 
In order to establish whether an AI-generated work can be protected under the current 
law, one must look into the originality requirement that is a fundamental requirement 
for copyright protection within the EU. Further, even though the original work may 
claim copyright protection, the originality cannot be understood without the reference to 
the author. The copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the relevant protected 
work. This is consistent with the provision of Art 3(1) of Berne Convention, according 
to which: 
“The countries of the Union, being equally animated by the desire to protect, as 
affective and uniform a manner a possible, the rights of authors in their literary 
and artistic works.” 
Moreover, the Art 2 of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC introduces the notion of an 
author for which all Member States must provide exclusive rights to authorize or 
prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent, reproduction by any means and in 
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any work, in whole or in part.  However, neither EU nor international instruments 
contain a general definition of the “author”.118 It has not been explicitly determined that 
the author needs to be a human being and hence, the interesting question whether an AI 
system can claim authorship for a work arises. 
In the absence of definition of the “author”, when analyzing the legal status of AI-
generated works under current law, the originality requirement is in the core of the 
analyze.119 Can an AI-generated work be an original work of authorship meant in the 
CJEU case law? From the case law of originality, it can be seen that the notion of the 
“author’s own intellectual creation” is determined based on the process leading up to the 
work of art rather than the characteristics of the final output. Namely, it needs to be 
evaluated whether the process is a creative as such and whether the author expresses his 
or her creativity in an original manner. It can be seen that original has nothing to do 
with uniqueness or quality, but originality in the EU copyright law means creativity 
expressed through intellectual process of free creative choices meaning that these 
choices cannot be constricted by technical requirement or rules.120 Hence, the main 
assumption about the creativity of the author is clear – there has to be an unrestricted 
space where intellectual choices and decisions can be made by the author.121 
As AI technology is getting more and more advantageous, there are people claiming that 
AI systems can be truly creative. This type of argumentation is based on the assumption 
that AI systems are able to do unexpected things and deviate from rules if their code 
incorporates elements of randomness, such as is the case of AI relying on artificial 
neural network technology. These scholars define creativity simply as a set of traits or 
behavior and hence argue that creative acts can be carried out by machines.122 For 
instance, Professor Yanisky-Ravid states that AI systems can autonomously generate 
creative works, glorifying that “AI systems are creative, unpredictable, independent, 
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autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of data collection, communicative, efficient, 
accurate, and have free choice among alternatives.”123 
However, the CJEU has consistently formulated the threshold requirement for 
authorship in terms of mind and intellect. Mind and intellect is something that only 
human beings have. It can be seen from the CJEU case law of originality that in order to 
a work being creative, and hence original, one must be able to establish the existence of 
a consciousness of the production of it.124 Thus, simply by making AI systems to do 
things that we associate with creativity cannot be regarded to be enough. The machine 
still cannot be regarded consciousness and hence, truly creative. For instance, Carriço 
has stated, the creativity encompasses intentions, emotions, aesthetic judgements, 
values, personal consciousness and moral sense—things that an algorithm, the basis of 
an AI system, cannot master.125 
 
Even though the AI relying on machine learning and neural network technology is able 
to generate unpredictable output, its functioning is still tied to the predetermined 
materials and the human actor behind the machine. AI systems do not after all make 
conscious choices by themselves, but they do what human beings have planned them to 
do. No matter how sophisticated the AI systems would be, without humans behind the 
machines they would not generate anything. For instance, engineer Charles Babbage has 
argued that “computers do not originate anything, they just follow orders”.126 Hence, the 
room for actual creative freedom is limited. This strongly suggests that AI-generated 
works are not eligible for copyright protection in the EU. 
Further, in Football Dataco, the CJEU introduced something that refers to the 
relationship of the author with the final work, namely the “personal touch” 
requirement.127 Hence, from the CJEU case law, the requirement of originality needs to 
be understood meaning that an original work must reflect the author’s personality, 
which clearly means that a human author is necessary for a copyright work to exist. As 
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the AI system has no personhood, it cannot be regarded leaving a “personal touch” to a 
work or any other way expressing his or her personality. This further supports the claim 
that an AI system cannot be regard as author and hence, AI-generated works are not 
protectable under the current EU law. 
This conclusion is in line with the EU copyright framework in general. Even though not 
explicitly stated in the legislation or case law, the human author is nevertheless a strong 
assumption driven historical considerations. Historically, the need for authors being 
humans is a longstanding assumption in copyright laws of the Member States. In the 
European tradition, the originality requirement has traditionally regarded to refer to the 
personal, individual input of the author. The idea of authorship has been connected with 
a strong belief that creative work is “the work of the mind”, an expression of author’s 
personality, belonging to creator.128 Due to the strong emphasis of “romantic author” 
figure in the European tradition, the rights have been allocated only to humans. 
Moreover, even though the Berne Convention does not explicitly define the term 
“authorship”, by looking at the text of the Berne Convention, a strong argument for the 
requirement that an author needs to be a natural person can be made.129 First, the 
proposition is supported by the fact that there is a minimal requirement for the 
protection of moral rights, and according moral rights to an AI system does not make 
sense.130 Moreover, the Art 7(1) of the Berne Convention131 determines the term of 
copyright protection on the basis of the death of the author: 
“The term of protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author 
and fifty years after his death.” 
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The reference made to the “death of the author” clearly refers to the lawmaker’s purpose 
to determine the author as a human being. As an AI is not something capable of dying, 
it cannot be considered as the author of a work either.132 
In addition, the underlying rationale for EU copyright protection suggest that AI would 
not be capable for being an author and vesting copyrights. The personhood theory 
emphasizes the rights of individuals to protect their personhood and is based upon the 
idea that intellectual products can be said to owe their existence to one or more 
individual creators.133 As AI has not personhood, the personhood theory is not 
applicable justification for protection. Moreover, the copyright protection is justified by 
reward theory, according to which it is important to secure reward for the author of the 
work. This rationale does not apply in respect of AI as an AI system is not something 
conscious that would copyrights or even understand if copyrights would be granted to it. 
Incentive theory is applicable justification to regard an AI system as an author either. 
Unlike humans, AI systems do not need incentives to create artworks.134 
No witnesses can be found from the other jurisdictions either that authorship would be 
awarded to AI systems, or someone else than humans. In the US case Naruto v. 
Slater135, it was ruled that a photograph taken by a monkey cannot be awarded 
copyright protection as only a human being can be granted copyrights under the current 
US copyright regime.136 Even though it was a question of animal authorship and not 
specifically the machine authorship, it can be resulted in that the US court holds the idea 
that copyright authorship can be awarded only a legal person. Therefore, by analogy, it 
can be inferred how the court would resolve the question of machine authorship – it 
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would not be likely to accepted.137 The similar case has not been tried in the CJEU, but 
analogue how the courts would interpret the question in the future can be found from 
the case law of other jurisprudence especially taken into account the significance of US 
tradition in the field of copyright law.138 
Although there is a large number of academic writings regarding the copyright 
protection of AI-generated works under the US copyright act, there is not much 
academic writing on copyright to AI-generated works under the EU copyright law yet. 
However, Handig has claimed that the expression “author’s own intellectual creation” 
formulates that a human author is necessary in order to a work being protected under 
copyright.139 In addition, Rosati discusses about copyright protection of AI-generated 
computer programs in the EU and states that the human intellectual effort needs to be 
performed in the generation of the computer program in order to protect the program 
under copyright.140 
Based on the CJEU case law, historical considerations, theoretical justifications, case 
law from other jurisdictions as well as academic writings regarding the topic, it can be 
concluded that the copyright cannot be claimed to the AI-generated works under current 
EU legislation if the human author cannot be established. The lack of human input in 
the creation process of AI-generated works suggests that the works cannot be protected 
currently. Even though the work itself would be considered exceptionally artistic, it is 
the creation process rather than output that is under the consideration.  
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4.2 What is sufficient human input? 
As stated previously in this thesis, the EU copyright law being technology neutral, the 
use of AI as a tool does not impose challenges in respect of copyright protection. Hence, 
if a human uses AI as a tool for creating a work, the human user can claim protection 
for the work. On the other hand, it has been concluded that if an AI system generates a 
work independently, with no human input, the work is not eligible for the protection 
under the current copyright law. This is the case of modern AI tools, such as Google’s 
“Deep Dream”, where the algorithm relies on machine learning and neural network 
technology in the production of art works. 
However, even though the AI system carries out the actual production process 
independently, there are still human beings behind the machine and giving some input 
to the production process, at least indirectly. For instance, humans can select the input 
materials provided to the AI system, take decisions regarding the commercialization of 
the works or write the underlying algorithm. Following in this thesis, it will be analyzed 
what would be sufficient human input in order to claim protection under the current EU 
copyright regime. 
First, it can be seen from the case law of CJEU that the threshold of originality has been 
set relatively low. It can be formulated from the CJEU jurisprudence that in order to 
reach the required level of originality it suffices that an author makes some free and 
creative choices and therewith put his or her personal stamp in the work.141 Hence, even 
if an AI system plays an important role in the creation process, the minimal human 
contribution can make it possible to claim a protection for the work. 
As the CJEU stated in Painer, the author can make free and creative choices in several 
ways, at various phases in the production.142 Hence, in case of the AI generation, the 
human can make the creative choices for instance only in the output or input phase of 
the production, and not through the whole production. For instance, it is can happen that 
an AI system creates independently works but a human participate in selection of the 
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final work. In the Infopaq case, the court indicated that the act of selection can be an 
intellectual act relevant to the legal evaluation: 
“…It is only through the choice, sequence and combination…that the author 
may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which is an 
intellectual creation.”143 
Thus, if an AI system creates a bunch of works from which the human selects which 
one is worth for further distribution, it might be enough in order to claim the protection. 
For instance, today’s music industry provides example of the mixture of AI generation 
and human selection. The AI systems are still unable to evaluate the value of the music 
generated and humans often listen through the generated pieces in order to evaluate 
which of the pieces are worth to distribution and which are not to be preserved.144 
Another example can be found from the automated journalism where AI generates news 
articles. Today, it is common to find AI-generated news especially in the field of sport, 
financial news or other stories based on statistics and numerical figures. For example, 
the software “Quill” that was presented previously in this thesis is an example of AI that 
generates news articles independently, relying on machine learning. The user of “Quill” 
only needs to press the button of the system.145 However, even though the sophisticated 
AI systems produce news articles autonomously, they still often make errors. Hence, 
humans need to read the articles through and select the articles that can be published 
and reject the biased ones.146 From the justifications of Infopaq, it could be argued that 
this type of selection of the final work generated by AI would contribute enough in 
order to claim copyright for human. 
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Moreover, humans often select the input material that is provided to the AI system. If a 
human being carefully selects specific input data to be provided to the AI system with 
the intention that the system will create a work of a certain nature could be enough to 
satisfy the originality requirement, even though the creation itself was performed by the 
AI.147 However, in this case, the sufficient creativity and personality in the selection of 
input materials needs to be established. For instance, an UK based artist Anna Ridler 
uses neural network technology in the art production using only her own sketches and 
photography as a training sets. According to Ridler, “it is this construction of a 
database—what to include, what not to include, that becomes a creative act and very 
much part of the piece.”148 In this type of selection, the artist can probably claim the 
copyright based on the creative acts made in the selection. 
However, it is likely that not all selection processes can fulfil the threshold of originality 
requirement. Especially technology companies that produce AI art for commercial 
purposes rely on large amount of public domain data to train their algorithm and do not 
make any specific selection among data. For instance, Google scanned millions of 
publicly available books in order to develop and train a chat robot. This cannot be 
regarded warranting sufficient originality in selection.149 Another example is the Project 
Next Rembrandt, where the team behind the machine simply mined all the publicly 
available paintings of the dead author and provided them to the AI system. The team did 
not contribute the materials anyhow or make any precise selection among the paintings 
and hence, it cannot be regarded that the selection made by the team can be regarded 
original enough. 
In addition to the selection, another possible source of originality in AI-generated works 
could be in the intellectual contributions of human being in building the underlying 
learning algorithm.150 The programmer after all is the author of the author of the 
work.151 Without programmer’s creativity in building the learning algorithm, the work 
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would not have never brought into existence. For instance, Davis states that the 
programmer should be seen as the author as “human action is inevitably at the core of 
the creative process” that leads to the production of such works.152 Especially, if the 
work produced by the AI program is excellent quality, it would be fair to award the 
programmer at least part of the excellence, as creating excellent program is 
intellectually demanding, time-consuming and expensive.153 
The solution of regarding programmer as an author of the work generated by the 
program that he or she has coded has also recognized in the recommendation of WIPO 
and UNESCO.154 The recommendation states that the programmer could be recognized 
as a co-author if the programmer contributed to the work such a creative elements 
without which the resulting work would not be entitled to copyright protection.155 
However, the recommendation does not mention the possibility that the programmer 
could be the sole author of the AI-generated work. 
In the UK case law, the programmer has been regarded as the author of the AI-
generated work. The UK High Court’s case Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games 
Ltd involved electronic pool games in which the individual frames displayed on screen 
when the game was played were considered computer-generated artistic works. The 
court found that the author of the works was the programmer who “devised the 
appearance of the various elements of the game and the rules and logic by which each 
frame is generated and who wrote the relevant program.” From this juridical ruling, it 
can be interpreted that at least in the cases where the programmer takes the most 
significant parts of the creativity process, the programmer could be held as an author. 
However, it should be noted that the case was tried in the UK court and no similar 
rulings are held by the CJEU. 
As mentioned previously in this thesis, the program might have claim over the works 
generated by “weak AI” systems, where AI relies on heavily on the rule based algorithm 
and the result is predetermined by the programmer though the code. However, in respect 
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of the “strong AI” systems, relying on machine learning and neural networks, I argue 
that the programmer may be entitled to the copyright of the AI program, but may not 
have rights for future products created by the AI system. After all, the programmer 
creates only the potentiality for the work, not the actuality.156 The “creativity” of an AI 
system is not creativity of the programmer; the causal link is not close enough to justify 
authorship of the programmer. What the output produced by a moderns AI program is 
not predictable by the programmer.157 
For instance, in the case of Google’s “Deep Dream”, the creativity of the programmer 
during the coding process is not likely to be sufficient as the “Deep Dream” acts totally 
by its own.158 As Bridy has stated, by awarding rights to a person who merely creates a 
potentiality but not the actuality would be a significant break from traditional copyright 
and something very important about the nature of these works would be missed.159  
 
The fact that the program can develop at the hand of the user makes the nexus between 
the work generated by the program and the programmer even further.160 Today, AI 
system constantly develops as a result of new input and new results.161 Hence, even 
though it would be tempting to collapse the distance between the programmer and the 
output of the learning algorithm created by the programmer, this approach would be 
analytically loose, ignoring both the machine origin of AI-generated works and their 
relationship to human authorship and creativity.162 
 
To conclude, based on the CJEU jurisprudence, it can be claimed that even a minimal 
human input at some phase of the creation process can be sufficient in order to claim for 
the protection. Based on the case law of the CJEU, it can be argued that in the case 
where AI generates the work but the human involves in the selection process, the 
sufficient human involvement may exists. The selection can take place either in the 
input or output phase of the AI-generation. If the AI system generates a great number of 
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works from which the human selects which of the works is worth for further 
distribution, this may warrant originality. Further, if a human carefully selects specific 
input data to be provided to the AI system, with the intention that it will create a work 
of a certain nature, this could be enough to satisfy the originality requirement, even 
though the creation itself was performed by the AI.163 The programmer may be entitled 
to the copyright of the AI program, but have no rights for future products created by AI 
as the “creativity” of an AI system is not creativity of the programmer. The programmer 
causes only the potentiality, not the actuality of the work and hence, causal link is not 
close enough to justify authorship of the programmer. 
The more autonomous the creation, implicating the least human intervention, the more 
difficult it is to claim protection for the work under the current EU copyright system. If 
the act of the human is limited to pressing a button of the AI systems or entering 
“compose” into a music generation program, the contribution of a human user does not 
warrant sufficient originality necessary for protection.164 If there is neither the human 
selection, the AI-generated work is not likely to be protected.165  
However, even if the selection made by a human being might be regarded enough to 
claim copyright in the light of CJEU jurisprudence, this seems to be a grey area. In 
practice, a case-by-case analysis needs to be carried out in order to conclude whether 
sufficient level of human involvement can be established or not. An investigation to the 
creative process, not the final work, is required in order to be able to establish whether 
the work is eligible for protection. However, the differentiation between the AI system 
that is used as a supportive tool for human user and the AI system that autonomously 
creates work is blurred and this increases the complexity of the analysis. As the 
technology continues to develop, it will be more and more difficult to distinguish AI-
generated works from the work generated entirely by humans.166 
Moreover, as the current copyright regulation was not originally written with taking into 
account the AI considerations, it seems to be unclear whether the current legislative 
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environment, where AI-generated works fall within the public domain is the one the 
legislator find most suitable today. I claim that it is not. The Resolution of the European 
Parliament declares as follows: 
“…Existing legal regimes and doctrines can be readily applicable to robotics, 
although some aspects appear to call for specific consideration...”167 
European Parliament therefore states that even though the current legal rules can be 
applied also in the AI generation, there is some aspects that needs to be further 
considered. Based on the analysis presented in this thesis so far, this seems to be true: 
the current copyright regime is applicable when an AI system is used as a tool for 
human creator or even when a human behind the machine contribute the creation at least 
somehow, such as by making selection. However, the increasing number of AI-
generated works with no human input in the creation process is appearing to the market, 
such as painting generated in the Project Next Rembrandt, the music produces by 
JukeDeck or the painting generated by artist Memo Akten’s AI system. I propose that 
these type of creations require “special considerations”. 
5 SHOULD AI-GENERATED WORKS BE PROTECTED AND 
IF YES, WHO SHOULD BE THE OWNER AND HOW? 
5.1 Should AI-generated works be protected? 
5.1.1 Theoretical justifications 
As explained previously in this thesis, copyrights are exclusive rights: the existence of 
copyright in a particular work restricts the uses that can be made of the work. For 
example, if one purchases a book from a bookstore, in principle, he or she cannot 
legally copy the book. Thus, copyright always inhibits the people’s ability to 
communicate and share information. Hence, when establishing whether the AI-
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generated works should be protected, it needs to be carefully considered whether there 
is any legitimate justifications for granting the protection for these new type of works 
and what is the value of protecting the AI-generated works in the first place.  
First, it needs to be evaluated whether the justifications behind the copyright system 
allow or demand the copyright protection of AI-generated works.168 In the chapter 3.3 
of this thesis, the following justifications in the EU copyright law have been presented: 
personhood theory, reward theory and incentive theory. In the following, it will be 
evaluated whether copyright protection for AI-generated works is justified in the light 
of these justifications. 
According to the personhood theory, individuals have right for protection of their 
personhood and personal autonomy. Through the process of creation, a person comes to 
occupy the product he or she creates as an extension of himself. According to this 
theory, AI-generated works cannot be considered property to be protected by copyright 
as AI has not personhood from which the product could be extension of. Hence, the 
personhood theory cannot be used to justify the protection of the AI-generated works.169 
According to the reward theory, which is related theory to the personhood theory, those 
who invest time, money and energy to create intellectual products have special financial 
or personal need for the protection because of their investments. The reward theory is 
supported by the Labor theory of John Locke. According to Locke, individuals have 
natural rights of ownership in respect of their bodies, which rights reach through to the 
products they create in existence of their labour. This theory considers that as labor 
creates value, the man who has given birth to a thing should also enjoy it. However, this 
theory regards that only labor of human beings can make property. Hence, AI-generated 
works cannot be considered property to be protected under this theory either.170 
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According to the incentive theory, the purpose of copyright is to promote the creation of 
works for the benefit of the public. Copyright is a tool to motivate the creative activity 
of authors by giving them exclusive rights and control over the works they generate. It 
is true that the AI systems themselves do not need to be encourage to generate works 
and hence, it seem that this theory is not applicable either. However, there are still 
human beings in the behind of the machines that need incentive. The copyright 
protection is needed to promote the use and development of these AI systems. Without 
copyright protection, the users have no incentive to produce art by using AI technology 
and the developers of the AI systems have no incentive to invest in development of 
these systems.171 Granting the copyright protection to AI-generated works would 
encourage talented people and well-funded companies to invest in new technologies and 
use of these technologies.172 Hilty173 and Synodinou174, both independently, have argued 
that it is the economic rationale, namely, the investment protection, which is the most 
applicable justification to recognize legal protection for AI-generated works. 
If the AI-generated works are not granted protection, the commercial impact will be 
negative. Companies in various industries such as music, literature, and gaming are 
making use of AI in the production of works. Moreover, individual artists that earn their 
daily living produce art by the help of AI systems. If the AI-generated works are not 
protected the works can be reproduced by any competing companies or artists. This 
would create negative economic impact suffered by the original creator of the AI works. 
Financial incentive may be particularly important for the development of creative 
machines because producing such software is resource incentive.175 If the protection is 
not granted, this would lead in the decline in valuable creations in the society.176 
It can be concluded that the AI-generated works challenge the theoretical justifications 
of the copyright law as most of the theoretical justifications rely on human beings 
creating the works. The personhood theory or reward theory provide little support in 
protection of AI-generated works. However, incentive theory can be applied in 
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justifying the protection of AI-generated works as even though the author-in-fact, 
namely the AI system does not need incentive, there are human beings behind the 
machine who need to be incentivized. 
5.1.2 Value for protection for the society 
In addition to the need to establish that IP does in fact create the relevant incentive, it 
needs to be established whether the society benefits from the incentive it creates.177 If it 
can be demonstrated that AI-generated works benefit the society at least equally to 
human generated works, the protection should be granted. I claim that they do. 
Increasingly large number of works produced today by AI are indistinguishable in 
substance and value from works created by humans. The current stance where the AI-
generated works with no sufficient human input are not protected is ultimately counter-
productive and tenuous distinction.178 
Several studies and real life examples have shown that various AI systems have positive 
impacts in the society, economy and communities. For instance, self-driving cars, health 
care diagnostics and targeted treatment that rely on AI increase the quality of people’s 
lives.179 Various artistic works generated by AI, such as news articles, music, paintings 
and books increase the quality of people’s life too. The information theory of copyrights 
presented by Fromer states that what makes expressive works valuable to the society is 
that they make a contribution in at least one of two principle ways: by using that 
expression to communicate knowledge – be it systematic, factual or cultural – and by 
conveying expression that is enjoyable in and of itself.180 
Modern AI systems are able to generate expressive works that make the contributions 
for the society in both two ways. First, AI is able to generate expressions that 
communicate knowledge. For example, news articles generated by AI communicate 
systematic, factual and cultural knowledge that increase the knowledge in the society by 
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educating and cultivating people.181 Today, it can be claimed that AI reporters are able 
to share better, more interesting and accurate information than human reporters as the 
AI systems are capable to generate unbiased articles from the topics that majority of the 
people find interesting. For example, an algorithm owned by a software company 
“Knowherenews”182 generates news articles by first choosing the subject for the story 
based on what is popular on the Internet and then, looks at more than a thousand news 
sources to gather details on this subject. The algorithm then writes its own impartial 
version of the story based on the data gathered. As the news articles generated do not 
include the human reporters’ personal opinions, people will achieve “bias-fee” news 
that include more objective and accurate information.183 
Additionally, the ability of AI to generate literature, such as books, poets and other 
writings can help in education. The low quality of education in much of the developing 
world is no a secret and for a long time, the solution for the lack of educative materials 
has been in research. The most recent Annual Status of Education Report, produced by 
the Indian NGO Pratham, highlights the fact that more than half of grade five students 
can read only at grade two level. One of the reasons is the lack of educational 
materials.184 As AI systems are able to generate literature ever faster and cheaper way 
than humans, this could provide a solution for the problem of lack of educational 
material in the future. 
In addition, the Fromer’s information theory states that if the expression is enjoyable in 
and of itself, it is valuable for the society and should be protected.185 Examples of 
enjoyable AI-generated works include paintings, photos and music. The robotic art is as 
stunning and visually impressive than human generated art. This can be seen from the 
fact that market is eager to move artwork generated by AI. For example, the artistic 
robot “E-David” generates portraits that range from 100 dollars to 2.000 dollars. There 
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was a six-month waiting list for the portraits generated by E-David.186 Particularly 
atypical art collectors purchase AI-generated works, such as scientists, video game 
makers, and researchers in computer vision and AI.187 Moreover, the music generated 
by JukeDeck and photos generated by Google’s “Deep Dream” seem to be valued in the 
society as there is a demand for these type of services. 
The AI-generated works contain intelligence equivalent to the works created by 
humans. AI systems generate new artistic works by collecting input data that already 
include the human tendencies and preferences. For instance, in the Project Next 
Rembrandt, the algorithm made use of valuable portraits painted by the old master that 
are highly valued among the people. Moreover, the AI music generators utilize the 
compositions of great composers, such as Mozart, Bach and Beethoven.188 
Analogically, the AI-generated works satisfy people’s demand just as works created by 
human beings as they are generated based on the works that have been originally 
generated by human beings. Thus, if the AI-generated works can provide people what 
they demand for, protecting the AI-generated works by copyright and enhancing the 
creation of the AI-generated works serve the society’s interest.189 New technologies 
should, and they cannot mean new artificial values.190 If the AI-generated works benefit 
the society equally to human generated works, the AI-generated works should be 
protected.191 
As the AI systems become constantly more sophisticated, so will the quality and 
quantity of the AI-generated works produced. This promises great benefits in the fields 
of science, technology, and medicine, but in the creative realm too. Thus, while there 
still will arguable be human artists, musicians and writers engaging in creative process, 
a large part of tasks may be done by machines in the future. Commercially-viable AI 
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applications such as “JukeDeck” and Google’s “Deep Dream” produce commercially 
applicable work faster than cheaper that humans can ever do. 
As Maggiore has stated, it cannot be regarded to be rationale in the light of the benefit 
of the society, on the one hand to set the protection level low for the generations made 
by humans so that anything in which the human genius can be spotted is protected and 
on the other hand, not to grant the protection to AI-generated works that may be able to 
process input information much more accurately and in larger volumes than humans.192 
Without the incentive to produce AI-generated works, these type of works that people 
need in quantity and quality are not supplied in the market.193 
5.1.3 Practical considerations 
There are also important practical reasons for granting the protection for the AI-
generated works. Not protecting the AI-generated works would not be consistent with 
the historically flexible interpretation of copyright law. Particularly, it would be counter 
to the principle of technology neutrality that has been fundamental in shaping of 
copyright law for the digital era.194 The need to apply legal principles consistently, 
irrespective of the particular technology involved has been acknowledged explicitly by 
the European Commission.195 
Moreover, if the AI-generated works are not protected but the human generated are, the 
enforceability issue would be particularly acute. It is often difficult to prove whether a 
certain work is generated by an AI system of by a human. It would be difficult for the 
court to evaluate the origin of each work as it would require technical expertise and 
detailed information in respect of the production process. This would make the court 
cases long and expensive procedures.196 
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Further, it can be stated that not protecting AI-generated work is inconsistent political 
choice taking into account the temper of the time. Currently, both the EU legislator and 
the CJEU seem to favor maximizing IP protection, especially for high technology 
innovators.197 Moreover, in the Europe 2020 initiative, the Commission emphasizes its 
aim to develop an “innovation union” by improving framework conditions and access to 
finance for research and innovation to ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into 
products and services that create growth and jobs.198 Moreover, the Commission starts 
work with the Member States in order to have a coordinated plan on AI with the main 
aim to maximize the impact of investment at the EU, ensuring the global 
competitiveness of the EU in the AI industry.199 Taking into account these initiatives, 
not protecting the AI-generated works would be politically inconsistent. 
Moreover, as Burstyn has states, the publication of works should be promoted in its 
pure form. If the copyright protection is not granted to AI-generated works in pure 
form, this would incentive either not disseminate the works, alter the works to gain 
copyright or fabricate the details of the works origin, all of these being negative side 
effects.200 
To conclude, the legislation in the EU should be amended in order to guarantee the 
protection to AI-generated work. Releasing the AI-generated works in the public 
domain and denying the incentive to copyright to an increasingly large group of works 
that are indistinguishable in substance and value from works created by human beings 
would be a tenuous and ultimately counter-productive distinction. The legislation 
should be issued at the EU level as without the certain legal rules, there is a risk that 
Member States start drafting and issuing own national legislation that in turn would 
harm the functioning of internal market. As stated in the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC, 
preamble 6: 
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“Without harmonization at Community level, legislative activities a national 
level which in order to respond to the technological challenges might result in 
significant differences in protection and hereby in restrictions on the free 
movement of services and products incorporating, or based on, intellectual 
property, leasing to a defragmentation of the internal market and legislative 
inconsistency.”201 
In some countries legislative processes in order to protect AI-generated works have 
already been started, such as in the US and China.202 Moreover, some countries already 
protect the computer-generated work, such as the UK.203 The enhancement of the 
overall competitiveness of the EU economy in relation to its trading partners is an 
important aspect in the EU copyright policy goals.204 However, without taking any 
actions regarding the copyright protection of AI-generated works, the EU can lose out to 
other jurisdictions in the field of AI. 
5.2 If yes, who should be the owner? 
5.2.1 Ownership issue 
Thus far, it has been concluded that the AI-generated works are not protected under the 
current EU copyright law. Moreover, it has been concluded that the current legislative 
environment is not favorable but instead, the AI-generated works should be granted the 
protection similarly than the human created works as they contribute society at least 
equally. However, if the protection to AI-generated works is granted, it needs to be 
decided for whom to allocate the ownership rights. The party who is entitled to the 
rights, can benefit from the AI-generated works commercially, such as through sales or 
licensing arrangements. 
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Traditionally, the author of the work has been regarded also as the owner of the work. 
Hence, in the case of AI-generated works, the AI system, being the author-in-fact of the 
work, would be doctrinally regarded also as the owner of the work. However, as AI 
system is not currently recognized as a legal person, it cannot hold rights or bear 
responsibilities either.205 Hence, as it would be arguable challenging to allocate rights to 
a machine, also other possible ownership alternatives need to be discussed, as there 
often can be found humans behind the machine too. 
Establishing the most justified right holder as regard as AI-generated works is 
particularly difficult as there are often several parties participating in generating 
process. None of the parties provides sufficient human input in the creation process in 
the light of EU originality requirement in order to claim the authorship, and hence 
ownership, but they assist in the creation process somehow. For instance, in the Project 
Next Rembrandt, the parties that involved in the generating process of the AI-generated 
portrait were at least the programmers of learning algorithm, input data suppliers, 
algorithm trainers, feedback suppliers, user of the AI system or the company investing 
to the research and development of the AI system.206  
The following part of this thesis will focus on some of the potential right holders for AI-
generated works. The following ownership alternatives will be discussed: the AI system 
itself, the programmer and the user. 
5.2.2 Allocating rights to the AI system 
As stated above, the ownership cannot be currently vested to an AI system as the AI 
system has no legal personhood and hence cannot hold the rights. However, some 
scholars have adopted the idea that evolution of AI systems leads to the recognition of 
AI systems as independent legal entities entitled to legal and commercial rights and 
duties. Accordingly, some have argued that the solution for ownership issue regarding 
                                                 





AI-generated works would be to redefine the term “authorship” to include both human 
and non-human authors.207 
For instance, Abbott has strongly suggested vesting of legal rights for non-human 
authors and inventors. According to Abbott, vesting inventorship and authorship to non-
humans would be an innovative new way to encourage AI growth and development. He 
states that this could prevent AI-generated works from falling into the public domain 
and provide the programmers and companies behind these machines some exclusivity to 
the resulting copyrightable works.208 
Moreover, Professor Glenn has states that “Artificial intelligence already exhibits many 
human characteristics. Given our history of denying rights to certain humans, we should 
recognize that robots are like people and have human rights”.209 This type of 
personhood approach establishes that as AI systems have many similar cognitive 
abilities than humans, they should be similarly recognized as having personhood and 
rights.210 
The EU Commission is also discussing the possibility of allocating rights to the robots. 
The motion for resolution adopted by Parliament calls on the Commission to explore the 
implications of possible legal solutions for its future legislative instruments such as: 
“Creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the 
most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status 
of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, 
and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make 
autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.”211 
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However, I argue that this theoretical solution is controversial and it would lead to an 
uncertain future with several legal and practical challenges. The only benefit of 
machine-authorship is that it follows the logic of current copyright law, according to 
which the author-in-fact is the owner of the work. Treating AI systems as authors would 
eliminate the need to complex legal solutions that vest the rights to a party that has not 
participated in the creative process as such. Still, vesting authorship to an AI system 
does not make any sense in the light of justifications of copyright, as discussed in the 
chapter 5.1.1. of this thesis. The purpose of copyright is to encourage creating more 
works and hence expand knowledge and creative expressions in the society. An AI 
system does not arguable need such incentive to innovate.212  
As the current EU law requires the author to be a human, amending the definition would 
basically require constitutional revisions in various provisions, which are well 
established through the history of copyright law. As an example, the term of protection 
is determined based on the lifetime of author. As AI is not something capable of dying, 
extending the scope of authorship to include also AI would make the term of protection 
determined currently by referring to the death of author’s life meaningless.213 
Even though an AI system would be granted the authorship, AI being unconscious, it 
cannot think and act like humans. The AI system cannot enforce its right in the court or 
it cannot enter into sales or licensing arrangements. Hence, it seems to be highly 
impractical to vest rights to the AI system. In practice, it would be necessary to figure 
out the party having right to manage the rights allocated to AI system and ensure the 
right such as claims in case of infringement.214 
The requirement of consciousness for copyright protection supports the claim that the 
rights should be allocated to the human being behind the machine. The fact that a 
human being is something conscious, and an AI system is not, has crucial importance in 
the evaluation of ownership allocation. Consciousness of the human actor needs to be 
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seen being in the core of the copyright protection and even though the human actor 
behind the machine would lack the necessary originality, he or she should still be seen 
the only feasible alternative to hold the rights. 
To conclude, the ownership in AI-generated works should not be allocated to the AI-
system due to the lack of theoretical justifications and several impracticalities. The 
ownership should be vested only to humans in the future, as humans are conscious and 
capable of enforcing the rights. 
5.2.3 Allocating rights to the programmer 
When considering if it would be justified to allocate the rights to the AI-generated 
works to the programmer, it can be considered that without the programmer’s input 
building the learning algorithm, the work would not have brought into existence.215 
Hence, it can be asked whether the programmer should have ownership right also for 
the work generated by the learning algorithm that he or she has coded. 
Brustlyn is a strong proponent of programmer ownership and according to him, the 
programmer is always the one who makes necessary effort and investments for the 
creation of the AI-generated works through programming and thus should be vested 
rights.216 Also, Samuelson has suggested that if the AI-generated work is excellent 
quality, it would be fair to award the programmer at least part of the excellence, as 
creating excellent program is intellectually challenging, costly and time-consuming.217 
However, even though the intuition would suggest allocating the ownership to the 
programmer, as already discussed in the chapter 4.2., the output of the AI system is not 
predicted by the programmer. The programmer creates only the potentiality for the 
creation of the output, not the actuality of the output. As Samuelson has stated, 
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awarding rights to a person who merely creates the potentiality for, but not the actuality 
of a work would be a significant break from traditional copyright principle.218 
There are also several impracticalities tied to awarding rights to the programmer. First, 
the enforceability problem suggests not vesting the ownership to the programmer. It 
would be difficult for the programmer to control his rights as the control over the work 
is typically at the hand of user of the AI system. Without any reporting requirements, 
the user has a strong interest not to notify the programmer that a work has been created 
by the AI system.219 
Second, there can be several programmers participating to the creation process. If 
multiple people are involved, the authorship of works generated by an AI system could 
potentially be contentious. All the programmers would be hold as the owner of the AI-
generated works. Especially, in the sales or licensing arrangements this would cause 
problems. If the AI system would be sold or licensed to a third party, a consent of all 
programmers should be achieved in order to conclude the sales or license agreement. 
This would increase the transactional costs of the commercial arrangements and 
diminish the effectiveness of the market.220 
Most importantly, it is fair to claim that the programmer does not need the ownership 
rights in the AI-generated works as the programmer can protect his or her interest by 
other ways. The programmer can decide not distributing the learning algorithm and 
generate as much works as he or she wants.221 However, if the programmer chooses to 
distribute or licensee the algorithm, the programmer should agree that some of the rights 
are transferred to the acquirer or licensee. If the ownership would be vested to the 
programmer, there would be no incentive for the user to apply the purchased or licensed 
algorithm. The programmer can however bargain with purchaser of licensee for a share 
of ownership or royalties attributable to work generated by the algorithm.222 
It is noteworthy that under the Software Directive 91/250/EC, the programmer has the 
ownership rights in learning algorithm itself. Hence, the programmer is already 
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provided with the incentive to generate the algorithm. If the rights in the AI-generated 
works would be allocated to the programmer too, the programmer would be over-
rewarded. Over incentivize is not the purpose of the IP system, but the right balance 
between the access and incentive needs to be sought. 
To conclude, the effort and investment made by the programmer in the coding of the 
learning algorithm may suggest that the rights for works generated by AI should be 
vested to the programmer. However, even though granting a copyright to a programmer 
might sound theoretically applicable solution, due to the several impracticalities and 
lack of justifications, the programmer should not be granted the rights to the output 
generated by the AI system. The programmer would not be left without rights as he or 
she would be rewarded under the Software Directive 91/250/EC. 
5.2.4 Allocating rights to the user 
Even though the user of an AI system has not contributed the AI-generated work 
creatively and hence, the ownership cannot be vested to the user under the traditional 
copyright doctrine, it needs to be evaluated whether there are other justification to 
support the user ownership. 
The user is the one who wants the works being generated and instigates its creation by 
commanding the AI system to run.223 Without the user’s act, the work would not 
become into world. This intention to generate a work should be regarded an important 
factor when evaluating the ownership allocation.224 The copyright law purpose is to 
incentive to generation of new works. If the user is not provided rights to the works, he 
or she has no incentive to employ advanced AI systems in the creation of the works. 
Moreover, by vesting the ownership to the user, the necessity of pursuing the distinction 
between the AI-assisted and AI-generated works would be eliminated.225 It is likely that 
if the copyright protection is denied from the user, the user claims that he or she 
authored the work anyway. Distinguishing the situations in which an AI system is used 
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only as a tool and where the system acts independently is arguable a difficult task to the 
court. The determination requires detailed inquiry into the nature of interaction between 
the user and the machine and the sophisticated understanding of the functioning of the 
algorithm.226 However, if the ownership is allocated to someone else than the user, this 
distinction needs to be made and the number of litigation would be likely to increase. 
Further, the user is at the best position to bring the work into the marketplace as the user 
is the most close of the final materialization of the work.227 Innovations that are kept 
secret do not benefit the society as much as innovations that are revealed. Those who 
can increase the supply of works should be vested copyrights. In respect of AI-
generated works, the users of the AI systems should be vested with copyright as only 
they can control the supply of the works.228 Granting copyright to the user would 
incentive he or she to bring the work into the public circulation. Vesting the authorship 
to the user would thus be the most consistent with the general goals of the EU copyright 
law that is to advance the pace of the innovation.229 This strongly suggests that the 
ownership should be vested to the user of the AI system. 
Hristov is a strong opponent of user ownership. He has stated that by rewarding the 
copyright to the user at the expense of the programmer would encourage free-riding as 
the users would benefit without supplying similar level of effort by themselves.230 
However, the user cannot be regarded free-riding as the user invests in the AI system 
through purchase of licensing arrangements.231 The user should be rewarded for such an 
investment by providing copyright protection for works generated as a result of the 
investment. If the user cannot protect the works generated by the AI system, he or she 
has paid for, the user would not likely invest in the AI systems. Moreover, a number of 
AI systems that are today used in the generation of works are open source software. If 
the programmer makes the decision to launch the software as an open source software, 
they cannot blame users for free-riding. 
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Further, it is notable that through licensing or selling the AI system, also the 
programmer is rewarded appropriately.232 By vesting rights to the user would indirectly 
encourage also developers of AI systems to develop more sophisticated systems as 
vesting ownership for the user would give users to incentive to go around looking for 
good AI systems to exploit. This market mechanism would benefit the user and the 
developers of the AI system both.233 
Yanisky-Ravid has interestingly argued that we should allocate the rights to the user as 
in addition to the rights, the user would also bear accountability of the AI system’s 
production. Yanisky-Ravid states that in addition the AI systems having a positive 
impact on the society, there are several drawbacks to these advanced systems, such as 
infringements, damage, suffering and the risk of loss in control. Yanisky-Ravid states 
that the user of the AI system would be in the best position in preventing these negative 
outcomes stemming from the AI systems and hence, both the right and the 
responsibilities should be allocated to the user.234 
To conclude, innovation advancement, practical considerations as well as accountability 
issue support to user ownership. 
5.3 How to allocate the ownership: work-for-hire as a solution 
So far in thesis, it has been concluded that it is necessary to protect the AI-generated 
works and further, to allocate the ownership in these works to the user of the AI-system. 
A feasible solution for ownership allocation to the user can be found in the work-for-
hire doctrine in the US Copyright Act.235 The work-for-hire doctrine is a deemed 
authorship doctrine that establishes that a specific person or a legal entity, other than the 
actual creator, is deemed to be the “author” of a particular work.236 This attributed 
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authorship carries all of the vested rights of the copyright and the original creator of the 
work retains no residual rights because no rights ever vested in his or her.237 The section 
101 of the US Copyright Act defines a work-for-hire in two parts: 
“1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment or; 2) a 
work prepared under special order or commission by an independent contractor, 
provided that the parties have signed an agreement designating the work as one 
made for hire, and provided that the work falls into one of nine categories 
enumerated in the statute.”238 
The work-for-hire doctrine presents an existing mechanism for directly vesting 
ownership of a copyright in a natural or legal person who is not the author-in-fact of the 
work in question.239 I suggest that similar approach would be adopted in the EU in 
allocating the ownership in the AI-generated works to the user. In order to apply the 
work-for-hire doctrine in the AI-generated works, the terms employee and employer 
should be reinterpreted in a way that AI system would be referred as to “employee” and 
the user of the AI system would referred as to “employer”. 
The rationale of work-for-hire doctrine is applicable in the relationship between the user 
and the AI system. The work-for-hire doctrine has been explained with the observation 
that “the motivating factor in producing the work was the employer or contractor who 
induced the creation”.240 The policy rationale is to incentive the employer or contractor 
at whose instance, direction, use, commercial purpose or risk the work is prepared, as 
well as give them control over the commercial force in the work.241 The user, with his 
or her intention to produce a certain work, is the motivating factor in producing the 
work. As a result of intentional and conscious act of the user, the work become into 
existence. The user operates the AI system and provides direction to the system by 
instructing it what to paint, write or compose. Moreover, the user is the one who takes 
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the financial risk by purchasing or licensing the AI system and supplying it with input 
material and energy in a wish of producing a commercial product.242 
However, the application of work-for-hire doctrine to the AI-generated works as such is 
not that straight forward. This is due to the two type of obstacles. First, there are some 
fundamental limitations set by the employment and contract law in the doctrine. 
Second, the applicability of the common law based work-for-hire doctrine in the EU is 
rather challenging as the work-for-hire doctrine is not currently recognized in the most 
of the EU countries.243 
As the US work-for-hire provisions are currently drafted, they cannot be readily applied 
to AI-generated works. It is difficult to define a legal, contractual, employment or 
agency relationship between a human and an AI system. If we look into the definition of 
section 101(1) of the US Copyright Act, the relationship between the user and the AI 
system is not an employment relationship within the purpose of the section.244 Whereas 
the human employee has legal rights and duties by agreement with the employer, an AI 
system cannot be said to enter an agreement for employment, nor can it assert its legal 
rights or be cognizant of its legal duties.245 
Neither is the definition of section 101(2) of the US Copyright Act directly applicable. 
As an AI system has no legal personhood, it is not able to conclude a contract with the 
commissioning party in order to assign the rights in the work. An assignment is a 
contractual concept that entails all elements necessary in a normal contract: mutuality, 
consideration and performance. As Butler states, it is hard to see how these elements 
could be satisfied by the AI system without doing severe damage to the traditional 
ambit of contract law.246 
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As concluded previously in this thesis, AI system is unconscious. Consequently, it has 
been concluded that it cannot be regarded as the author under the current EU law or it 
cannot be vested ownership rights in the future. For the same reason, we are not be able 
to classify it as an employee within the meaning of agency law or grant it legal capacity 
to conclude contracts in the future. In general, as AI systems lack of personhood for 
purpose of copyright ownership, it seems wrong to try to characterize them as 
“employees” or “contractors” in the way that this notion is currently interpreted under 
the work-for-hire doctrine.247 
Instead, in order to apply the work-for-hire doctrine in allocating the ownership in AI-
generated works to the user, the terms “employer” and “employee” need to be 
interpreted for this purpose. Hristov suggests the “relative interpretation” of these terms 
as a solution. According to Hristov, terms “employer” and “employee” should not be re-
interpreted strictly but they should be left open to interpretation in order to satisfy newly 
arising requirements. This could mean that the user, as an “employer” may be 
considered as someone who employs the services of another entity in order to achieve a 
goal or complete task. Further, the AI system could be considered as an “employee” of 
the user since its generative services are employed by the user.248 Hence, it is suggested 
that EU would implement the work-for-hire doctrine applicable specifically to the AI-
generated works by following the relative interpretation of the terms. 
The application of work-for-hire doctrine in allocating the rights to the user would 
resolve many issues. First, copyright would be vested to a natural person instead of non-
human with no legal protection. Human user, as a natural person, would be fully 
responsible under the law, enjoying both privileges and bearing responsibilities related 
to it. Hence, by allocating the authorship to the user under the work-for-hire doctrine, 
the human authorship requirement of EU copyright law would be fulfilled. This would 
eliminate the need for lengthy debate over the legality and practicality of non-human 
authorship. Another problem that would be avoided is the issue related to the term of 
                                                 
247 Denicola (n 49), p. 283. 




protection. If the authorship is directly vested from the AI system to the user, the 
protection would last the lifetime of the user plus 70 years.249 
However, the application of this common law based doctrine is challenging in the 
European legal tradition.250 Moral rights are in the core of the European copyright 
tradition. However, there is no moral rights in the work-for-hire doctrine. The lack of 
moral rights it the fundamental reason why most of the EU Member States do not 
recognize the work-for-hire doctrine or any other type of deemed authorship 
doctrines.251 Whereas the US work-for-hire exemption treats the employer or 
commissioning party as the author, most of the EU Member States vest all rights in the 
author despite any status as employee or independent contractor.252 The author can then 
transfer some or all of his or her rights to a third party through contractual agreement. 
However, only economic rights can be transferred.253 
Hence, the excuse of moral rights in respect of AI-generated works would be necessary 
in order to apply work-for-hire doctrine in the EU.254 A fictitious author should not 
enjoy moral rights, which are heavily linked to the personality of human author.255 
Hence, in the EU, the application of work-for-hire doctrine requires both a 
comprehensive amendment of the existing law and the legal practice.256 This is 
however, only a question of careful consideration and drafting. 
Interestingly, even though the work-for-hire doctrine is not known in most of the EU 
Member States, the analogue in the existing legislation can be found to support the 
applicability of the doctrine within the EU. The employee-employer relation presented 
in the current EU legislation, namely in the Software Directive 91/250/EEC, supports 
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the allocation of rights, at least economic part of them, directly someone else than the 
actual author of the work. According to the Art 2(3) of the Software Directive 
91/250/EEC, 
“Where a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his 
duties or following the instructions given by his employer, the employer 
exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the program so 
created, unless otherwise provided by contract.” 
Hence, the legislator have regarded that in the case where a work is created by an 
employee acting as such, the best solution is to allocate the economic rights to the party 
who through the employment was responsible for causing a creative work to be brought 
into existence.257 Similarly, in the case of AI-generated works, the economic rights 
could be allocated directly to the user, being the “employer”, and in addition to exempt 
the existence of moral rights. I suggest that taking inspiration from the Art 2(3) of the 
Software Directive, the following provision could be issued at the level of EU in order 
to protect the AI-generated works: 
“Where a work is generated by an AI system in the execution of his duties, the 
user of the AI system exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights 
in the work so created. Moral rights shall not exist in the works generated by 
AI.” 
We already have a country in the EU that applies deemed authorship doctrine to the AI-
generated works and exempt the moral rights in such works. The UK has introduced 
provisions regarding authorship in the copyright in computer-generated works, which 
were included in the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA).258 The CDPA 
states that computer programs may be used to generate literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works that will obtain copyright protection. A computer-generated work is 
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defined as a work “generated by a computer in circumstances such that there is no 
human author.”259 
The copyright of computer-generated works is attributed to “the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken”.260 This person, 
like the employer under the work-for-hire doctrine, is decide to be the author for legal 
purposes. The effect of the CDPA provisions is that where a work is computer-
generated, similarly to the work-for-hire doctrine, it may obtain copyright protection 
because authorship is attributed to the person who undertook the arrangement necessary 
for the creation of the work.  Therefore, the provision fictionalizes an author for the 
purposes of conferring protection similarly to work-for-hire doctrine.261 
The CDPA provisions are an example of exemption in moral rights. During the 
discussion of the enactment of the CDPA, it was stated that “moral rights are closely 
concerned with the personal nature of creative effort, and the person by whom the 
arrangement necessary for the creation of a computer-generated work are undertaken 
will not himself have made any personal, creative effort.” The CDPA 9(3) recognizes 
that there is no creative acts in the creation process carried out in respect of computer-
generated works, and therefore CDPA 9(3) has been framed as an exception to the 
creativity and originality requirement for obtaining the copyright.262 Similarly, the rest 
of the EU should adapt the exemption to the moral rights regime and value the AI-
generated works as such, without the creativity and originality coming from the human 
soul. 
Implementing the work-for-hire in the EU, under which autonomously acting AI 
systems would be seen as employees of the users will require new legislation. A 
fundamentally new components need to be included to the copyright legislation – most 
prominently, the recognition that works generated by AI systems are copyrightable even 
though there is no human creator in the traditional sense. All in all, in respect of AI-
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generated works, the rationale of the copyright law should be refocused from the 
“author” to the “work”. As the example of work-for-hire doctrine shows, the copyright 
law can do without the author, meaning that the law, at least in some countries, may 
tolerate a framework whereby the statutory author is divorced from the actual creator, 
but cannot do without the protected-subject matter which is the ultimate target and 
reason for protection.263 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In the long history of copyright law, the creativity has been considered uniquely human 
attribute. However, humans are no longer the only source of creativity or innovations. 
Today, the “strong AI” systems, relying on machine learning and artificial neural 
network technology, generate independently works of art in almost every copyrightable 
medium. In this thesis, various examples in the field or literature, music and visual art 
have been presented in order to illustrate the current development. The works generated 
by these modern AI systems have been referred as AI-generated works. 
In the first part of this thesis, it has been claimed the AI-generated works are not 
protected under current EU copyright law. This conclusion has been drawn primarily on 
the basis of the finding that the AI systems, no matter how sophisticated they are, are 
unconscious and hence, cannot generate work of art that would fulfil the fundamental 
requirement for protection, namely the originality requirement. Consequently, the 
interpretation of originality requirement and case law related to it establish that in order 
to a work being protected, the author needs to a human. It does not matter how 
artistically valuable the AI-generated works are, but if the creation process lack of 
sufficient human input, the current EU copyright law does not recognize them at all. 
Further, it has been claimed that even a minimal human input at some phase of the 
creation process can be sufficient in order to claim protection for the work otherwise 
generated by the AI system. It has been argued on the basis of the CJEU case law of 
originality that if an AI system generates the work but the human involves in the 
selection process, the sufficient human involvement for claiming the protection may 
exists. It has been illustrated in this thesis that the selection can take place either in the 
                                                 




input or output phase of the AI-generation. If the AI system generates a great number of 
works from which the human selects which one is worth for further distribution, this 
may warrant originality. Further, if the human carefully selects specific input data to be 
provided to the AI system, with the intention that it will create a work of a certain 
nature, this could be enough to satisfy the originality requirement, even though the 
creation itself was performed by the AI system. 
However, even though the selection might warrant originality, there is a large number of 
AI-generated works in the market that are both generated and selected independently by 
the AI system. The outdated nature of the current EU copyright law fails to reflect this 
reality resulting in the releasing a number of AI-generated works into the public 
domain. It has been found in this thesis that the underlying issue in the copyright 
protection of AI-generate works in the EU is the view of the “romantic author”. The 
current copyright law focuses on rather the production process than the outcome. 
However, common law countries, such as EU’s rival US, adapts utilitarian approach to 
copyright. I has suggested that in order to maintain the competitiveness, the EU should 
follow this path. Granting the protection to AI-generated works, where no human input 
in the traditional sense can be found in the creation process, but that however are 
incrementally valuable as such to the society, would be a starting point in this evitable 
change in thinking. 
Thus, in the second part of this thesis, it has been claimed that the AI-generated works 
should be granted protection similar to the works generated by humans. The current 
legislative environment does not benefit the willingness of investing in the development 
of AI. The consequences can be far reaching and result in decrease of valuable works in 
the society. The AI-generated works are culturally and artistically at least equally 
valuable to the human generated works, and hence, should be protected. It has been 
shown through several practical examples, in the field of education, art and newspaper 
industry that AI-generated works benefit largely our society. The argumentation that AI-
generated works should be protected have been further supported by the practical 
considerations, among other claiming that if the AI-generated works are not protected 
but the human generated are, the enforceability issue would be particularly acute as 
proving the machine origin of certain work would require technical knowledge and 
detailed information from the court. 
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Further, it has been assessed who of the following ownership candidates should be 
vested rights in the AI-generated works: the AI system, the programmer or the user. It 
has been argued that the AI system should not be granted rights itself but the 
requirement of consciousness supports the claim that the rights should be allocated to 
the human being behind the machine. AI system being unconscious, it cannot enforce 
the allocated rights, such as go to a court or enter into licensing arrangements. Hence, 
allocating rights to an AI system would be highly impractical solution. The author of 
this thesis sees that the feasible solution is not to redefine the term authorship to include 
non-human authors but in order to avoid future legal complications and challenges, the 
authorship of a work should be allocated only a human beings also in the future.  
 
Moreover, it has been assessed whether the programmer or the user would be better 
owner candidate. It has been argued that the programmer should not be vested rights as 
the programmer creates only the potentiality for the creation of the output, not the 
actuality of the output. In addition, the lack of control and the fact that the programmer 
does not need the ownership rights in the AI-generated works as the programmer can 
protect his or her interest by other ways support the claim that rights should not be 
vested to the programmer. Importantly, under the Software Directive 91/250/EC, the 
programmer has the ownership rights in the AI system itself and hence, is already 
provided with the incentive to generate to algorithm. Over intensive is not the purpose 
of the IP system. 
 
It has been concluded that the user of the AI system should be vested the rights. If the 
users are not provided rights to the works, they have no incentive to employ advanced 
AI systems in the creation of the works. Another practical advantage in user ownership 
is that the necessity of pursuing the distinction between the AI-assisted and AI-
generated works would be eliminated. Most importantly, it has been claimed that the 
society would benefit most if the user has been allocated rights as granting copyright for 
the user would incentive he or she to bring the work into the public circulation. 
Moreover, it has been claimed that if the users are incentive to generate more works by 
AI systems, they will look around for market for better AI systems, both in quality and 
quantity. This market mechanism would encourage developers of AI systems to invest 
in development in more sophisticated AI systems and consequently, both the user and 





Lastly, it has been looked into other jurisprudences in order to find an applicable legal 
tool to allocate the ownership to the user. The US based work-for-hire doctrine has been 
proposed as a solution. Under this doctrine, the AI system would be regarded as a 
creative “employee” of the user.  The authorship would be allocated under the doctrine 
directly to the user, and the author-in-fact, namely the AI system, would be recognized 
as it in reality is, essentially as a tool. 
Challenges regarding the applicability of the work-for-hire doctrine to the AI-generation 
as such, and specifically within the EU have been identified. These challenges include 
issues related to contract and employment law as well as moral rights regime in the EU. 
However, the challenges identified are not obstacles but mere restrainers that can be 
addressed through careful consideration and drafting. Moreover, if the US is 
considering to allow protection of AI-generated works without the human authorship 
requirement, as can be believed from the wide discussion in respect of the topic among 
the scholars, EU should adapt the similar approach in order not maintain the 
competitiveness towards one of its major rivals. 
The world is changing and the methods of creating art are too. The foundation for AI 
research was established only less than 70 years ago. In these 70 years, AI technology 
has developed from predictable computer programs to intelligent neural network 
algorithms. As the sophistication and complexity of AI technology continues to grow, 
so will the number of works it produces. This thesis has argued that the traditional 
copyright law is inadequate to cope with the new AI technology involving in the 
creation process of art. It has been argued that in order to maintain the competitiveness 
of EU, new legislation needs to be drafted in the community level in order to grant the 
protection for AI-generated works. The law needs to be adapted to the reality of the 
modern world and it needs to be done quickly. 
 
